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The Image of Work
in the Proletarian
Novels of the Thirties
John K. Coulter
This paper will examine the image of work and of the work-place in
a group of American proletarian novels of the 1930s, particularly
those novels dealing with strikes and labor as a social category.
During these Depression years a strong movement among novelists
described the experience of industrial workers, as the productive
machine tried to adjust itself to difficult economic conditions. This
literary movement, coinciding with the numbing strain placed on our
national self-confidence and our faith in our economic system, with
the first organized or partially organized reaching out of international
communism from the Soviet Union, struggled through the resultant
fears and angers about patriotism and the definition of the “American
system,” and challenged everyone’s sense of himself, that of the
writer, the critic, the audience. No works or writers of the first rank
arose from this relatively short-lived experiment in collective literature,
but some very able people made interesting and important efforts in
proving the question of the relationship between literature and the
social conditions from which it arises.
Before 1 address the novels themselves, let me sketch in an
environment that gives my look substance and direction. I grew up
under the tutelage of a story-telling father, hearing the various parts
of his canon over and over with constantly shifting emphases, theses,
at times even story elements adjusted to immediate purposes. Two of
his stories, oft repeated and alluded to, gained near mythic status in
my mind. The first, always told as a factual, historical account, is this;
a young, discontented, not very successful Valparaiso University
chemistry student, former (WWI) Marine rifle instructor, caught
between an adolescent reluctance to dissipate and adulthood,
threshing about for some employment in a strike-ridden steel mill
town (Gary, Indiana), hired on as a rifle-carrying guard for the
Carnegie-lllinois Steel Corporation during a violence-filled strike,
the first and bloodiest of several aimed at gaining recognition for the
United Steel Workers. (This must have been about 1923 or 1924.)
Assigned a station atop the three-story Administration Building at
the main gate of Gary Works, he spent about an hour, like Beowulf
surveying the depredations of Grendel among the thanes in the
meadhall, watching the milling, rock-throwing strikers fronting a line
of barricades and a host of beclubbed and armed company police.

He mulled over his assignment: allow no forced entry to the
Administration Building. Then abandoning his rifle at his post, he
scurried down the fire-escape and scrambled over the barbed
perimeter fence to join the proletarian horde on the outside. (The
strike was broken a few days later by bayonet-wielding federal
troops. The corporation had won. Union recognition had to wait
another six or eight years.)
The second story, less singular in its character and plotline, came in
many more forms. But centrally it is an action, as Aristotle uses the
word, a complete action. The setting is an air-conditioned metal
lurgical laboratory, long, narrow, equipment-filled, though of no
very clearly delineated form, windows lining three sides, the whole
centered in a row of great, open-hearth furnaces, temperatures
sharply contrasting between the white coolness of the lab and the
Inferno of the “floor,” inner cleanliness and outer smog and gloom.
The dramatic personae are the begrimed workers, stripped above the
waist to dirty long-underwear or, often, to sweat-glistening flesh,
sharply muscled, crude of speech, obscene of gesture, noisy, aggressive.
But hearty, too, lusty, given to much laughter, rude joking. Very
manly. This, of course, represents the industrial era and sounds
nearly foolish as we move into the information age. But then the
Sunday afternoon football ritual sounds foolish too, and as E.M.W.
Tillyard suggests in his Elizabethan World Picture, an age’s unthought
image of itself and its surroundings runs many years behind its
intellectual understanding. The protagonist in my story is the
chemist, an observer-participant, cleanly dressed, amused, distanced
somewhat from the drama about him but also integrally involved.
The theme (this is not tragedy) is age-old and God-given: it is good.
I think of these private myths when I read ofTeiresias’command to
Odysseus who is seeking a way to mollify Poseidon for the offence
which caused the seagod to so plague Odysseus’ homeward journey
from Troy. Teiresias said that Odysseus, long oar on his shoulder,
must go inland so far the residents would mistake the oar for a
winnowing-fan, i.e., he must give up his self-definition as a seafarer,
and only then could he make obeisance to the god. Gods demand high
prices.
These tales, taken together, point to the subject of my study: the
image of work and ol the workplace. What role Marxism played in
American sell-questioning of the early thirties, given our Depression,
is a question perhaps unanswerable, but the central and defining issue
of the “proletariat” must be addressed. It is this: whose is the work
place? In the inner recesses of an industrial society, so deep in the
minds of the people as to be beyond stated and argued beliefs, beyond
even conscious thoughts about truths and realities, as the very soul of
2

such a people, who owns the work place? Whose is the factory, the
machine, the energy and motion of a productive system? What
constitutes ownership?
In 1833 in Sartor Resartus, just fifteen years before the 1848
uprisings which Marx thought to be so significant as proletarian
movements, Thomas Carlyle insisted that, instead of “the folly of the
impossible Precept, Know thyself," one needs to ask “this partially
possible one. Know what thou canst work-at." Studs Terkel, in his
Hard Times: an Oral History ofthe Great Depression, quotes Charles
Stewart Mott, once one of the central figures in putting together the
General Motors Corporation and hence a man of Croesian wealth,
speaking at ninety-four, after about twenty years as the benefactor of
southern Michigan in which role he held a near imperial throne of
philanthropy. Mott, referring to Governor (later U.S. Supreme
Court Justice) Frank Murphy, who during the momentous Flint
G. M. strike in 1936 had refused to use the national guard to recapture
the auto factories from sit-in strikers, charged that this head of civil
authorities “certainly lacked a lot of things that would have been
good ... He didn’t enforce the law. He kept his hands off. He didn’t
protect our property.’’ What Governor Murphy did do was to let
circumstances define property rights. By forcing General Motors,
and hence the industry, to accept a labor contract in order to
repossess its factories, he effectively limited industrial ownership. In
recognizing the union, G.M. eliminated from its own options in
responding to a strike a crucial weapon, the mass replacement of
workers. Mott, befuddled as the old tyrant was, was quite right in
maintaining that property rights had been abridged.
This abridgement signalled the intrusion of another value, perhaps
a higher cause, given the climate of the times: that of work itself, of
the individual man as a productive being even in an industrial setting.
Carlyle says that “our works are the mirror wherein the spirit sees it
natural lineaments.” Hence his incorporation of work as the centerpiece
of one’s self definition. His “Captains of Industry” are in his view the
real heroes and masters of society. Carl Murray Bates, the stonemason
in Terkel’s Working, summing up his attitude toward his work, says,
“There’s not a house in this country that 1 haven’t built that 1 don’t
look at every time I go by ... If there’s one stone in there crooked, I
know where it’s at and I’ll never forget it... [It’s] immortality as far as
[I’m] concerned. Nothing lasts forever . . . [even] Bedford limestone
deteriorates one-sixteenth of an inch in every hundred years... [but]
that’s getting awful close.” Carl Bates “owns” his work place, no
matter whether Charles Stewart Mott understands.
Literary critics and writers during the 1930s tried repeatedly,
without much agreement, to define sharply “proletarian literature.”
3

The term was first given currency by its use in 1930 by the Kharkov
Conference of Revolutionary Writers, a purely Marxist Soviet
source, after which it was routinely employed in the U.S., but not
clearly defined, by Michael Gold in The New Masses and by John
Reed Clubs in their attempts to develop a Marxist literature in a
capitalistic country. Two major general definitions developed, though
there were many variations of each and though a good many writers
strongly resented the use of the term at all. First, as Walter Rideout in
his The Radical Novel in the U.S., 1900-1954, summarizes, “ ‘prole
tarian’ would seem to describe fiction written by a member of the
working class about, presumably, working-class characters and
experiences”; second, the word refers to any fiction which depends
upon “the conscious ideology of the author [and] whether he
attempted, whatever his class origin, to work out in his fiction a
Marxist analysis of society.”
In this paper I shall not reworry these definitions. 1 will instead seek
out the Carlylean idea of the productivity of work as a basis for inner
ownership. “Awake, ye noble workers, warriors in the one true War,”
says Carlyle. “... Ye know at least this. That the mandate of God to
his creature man is: Work!” I shall look for comments about the man
whose defining days begin at the industrial time clock just as the
physician so binds “doctor” to his name that he omits it neither at the
P.T.A., nor at the swimming pool, nor the church. And I shall ask
what in industrial work is crucial to the worker.
The first novel 1 want to look at is Robert Cantwell’s The Land of
Plenty, a strike novel published in 1934, generally thought one of the
two or three best of the breed. The standard plotline for the strike
novel is this: a strike occurs; several opening chapters justify the strike
by focusing on unfair salary and unsafe working conditions; the
workers organize themselves after the spontaneous strike-beginning;
tension builds as we await the owners’ response; civil authorities,
unfairly influenced (usually bought), enter on the side of manage
ment; the strike fails, leaders are killed (or go to rigged courts or go
directly to jail); the need for a violent overthrow of the system is
affirmed. But Cantwell is a better writer than to use this and a more
thoughtful man (subsequent to his brief career as a novelist, he served
long and well in the Luce organization, an editor of one time and
another of Fortune, Time and Life magazines and then for two years
as literary editor of Newsweek.) His plot is divided into two parts:
Part I, entitled Power and Light, describes the events of a midnight
shift in a veneer factory in the U.S. northwest (doors seem to be the
chief product) when because of power failure, the plant goes dark and
machines stop. Part II, called The Education of a Worker, carries the
story on after a series of firings of key workers at the end of the night
4
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of confusion which brings into the open, to “the light,” if you will, the
“power,” not of electricity as the metaphor proclaims but of workers
and management as they wrestle over the subject of who “owns” the
mill and what their relation to the mill is. The workers are educated; it
is a bitter lesson they learn.
Several qualities of Cantwell’s work must be pointed out. First,
beyond the division of the whole into two “actions,” he addresses his
story by seeing the action of each chapter through the eyes and hence
the point of view of a different character. It is particularly important
that we gain some depth of understanding of Cantwell’s characters
because, his overall purpose being sociological, the prime danger for
such a work is the lack of the truth of individuation. This is indeed the
major failing of proletarian novels as a group. The individuals never
manage to rise above the generalization of class. I shall say more
about his characters later.
Second, Cantwell creates the class conflict in sufficient complexity
to catch a reality and to raise his criticisms of the economic system at
work. Cantwell suggests that the structure of the American factory
has a basic flaw; ownership absolutely rigid in its demands upon
management that profits be realized. The plant managers, given no
leeway in adjusting this absolute requirement to the vagaries of the
particular situation, tried not to produce veneered doors (in this
instance), but to avoid responsibility for failure. They find themselves
separated from the production workers physically in the metaphor of
the story but functionally in its meaning, and helpless to manage the
crisis of the power failure. Ironically the breakdown occurs on the 4th
of July. The dark and quiet factory, situated on a tidal flat a mile from
the town, looms in the lights of the fireworks celebration and starkly
proclaims the failure of the managerial system.
The workers in Cantwell’s veneer factory are of two kinds: the
majority are just order followers who are not meaningfully involved
in the purpose of the plant. When the saws are running, they work.
When the power fails, they sit down. The second kind of workers,
fewer in number, are the key. They are competent, fully masters of the
work, and self-motivated. They image a medieval master craftsman
mentality. But they also are uncooperative with management. When
Walt Hagens, their leader, was asked why he didn’t tell the
incompetent foreman how to manage the crisis, he replied; “Hell,
Carl didn’t want to know what to do. He just wanted me to be
responsible.” Then, turning away he added with contempt: “Carl
couldn’t understand anyway.’’Thus, productive workers and effective
management have to be separated, Cantwell maintains, and the
problem seems systemic.
One other factor needs to be mentioned. Marx, in the Communist
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Manifesto, speaks of a class of worker that is hardly worth saving
because it is so ill motivated, “social scum,” he terms them. Cantwell
has a group of workers who, through their irresponsibility and selfcenteredness, precipitate disaster among those managers and workers
who might have come together to avoid a complete breakdown. In
our heavy industry today there seems to be an attempt to bridge the
separation between responsible management and labor and to
overcome the intrusive effort (effect?) of the weakly principled.
Another novel of the lumber mills of the Pacific Northwest, Clara
Weatherwax’s Marching! Marching!, illustrates other common features
in labor novels. There are long passages, set pieces, describing the mill
at work. (Cantwell has some of this.) Here the problem is not
incompetent management but rather unfeeling, greedy management.
Unsafe working conditions and a speed up which leads to exhaustion
and crippling are the villains. Physical possession of the mill itself is
not a problem, for though the workers are locked out, management
makes no effort to run the factory with scabs as had been the case in
Land of Plenty.
The plot line (of Marching! Marching!) follows the creation of a
Workers Council and focuses on the necessity of a strike and the
arguments for and against worker organization. The charge of
communism is raised and refuted, and a struggle over which role civil
authority is to play becomes central.
The novel is not really about a production factory. Instead it deals
with an organizing working force which might have been Marxist
though it wasn't. Instead it has the tone of an industrial union bent on
striking a deal if it can get management to bargain, an early CIO.
There isn’t an attempt to seize control of a factory.
Mary Heaton Vorse’s Strike, however, is quite different. Here is
one of the six novels, all very similar, based on the 1930 Gastonia,
North Carolina, textile strike, and it is almost purely an account of
political and civil turmoil. It has nothing at all to do with a productive
industry or with an individual fulfilling himself through work. In this
story a strike begins as the novel opens and continues throughout. No
view of the inside of the factory is seen, and almost no mention is
made of what the factory produces. Instead, the story deals with a
political battle in which the work-place is only a tool. Marx says in
the Manifesto that the bourgeoisie could force the petty bourgeoisie,
the small shopkeepers and other people who directly serve the
proletariat, into the proletariat itself, thus producing in the end only
two significant classes. All the novels that focus on Southern textile
mills describe the workers as really hill people who have been drawn
by the possibility of wages from their poverty-stricken life in the
mountains. But these are not industrial workers, and Marx’s idea that
6

they would be pressed to this definition seems not here to function.
Though they work in the mills, they maintain their identification as a
complete mountain society (and they frequently retreat in family
groups to the old life in the hills).
Mary Vorse tells her story through the eyes of a northern labor
organizer who has been sent South to help these textile workers make
a union. From his view, the labor organizer tries to understand these
people, but he does not succeed. He finds them too unlike the
proletariat to which he is accustomed. He does not understand that,
beyond their dissatisfaction with inhumanly low wages, their basic
complaint is that the factory owners (and managers — there is not
separation in this simpler view) have taken as their right the
machinery of the law, the courts, the established commercial and
even religious worlds. The workers, truly outsiders to this urban life,
find their own family and communal structure ignored as though it
did not exist. Their revolt is, therefore, really a political one. They
don’t, of course, win. In the 1930s workers never win, but they don’t
really lose either. As independent people who have another life, that
in the hills, they are not so helpless as lumbermen who have no other
alternative. The textile mill stories tell of a running battle between
two worlds too different to meld but too independent to allow either a
complete victory. It is interesting that in these stories the machine is in
no way the villain. As we know, the running sore created by this
conflict is still open in many Southern communities today. And
unions are still generally unwelcome.
The most successful of the proletarian writers at understanding the
relationship between the industrial worker and his factory world was
Albert Holper, primarily a chronicler of urban Jewish ghetto life who
hated being labeled proletarian. In The Family, published in 1933, he
presents a picture of the growing power of labor unions, as well as an
account of the relationship of man and the machine.
Oddly, as the plot works itself out, the labor union, though it serves
as a strong counterforce to the owners, does not bring resolution.
This comes only with the individual worker’s insight into the nature
of his job. Worker and owner and foundry join in the created world
which all inhabit. But it is a hard world. This combination — and
particularly the presence of the machine — makes inordinate
demands on the individual. In his following book called The Chute
Holper underscores this. A story of work-life in a mail-order house in
Chicago seen through the eyes of a young boy, the dominance of the
machine is made clear. This five-story building, filled with the stock
of the Golden Rule Mail-Order Company, is dominated by a central
chute down which items are sent to the packaging and mailing room.
The gigantic maw, its insatiable appetite and the disembodied voices
7

booming out “Hurry! hurry!” from below focus time and place on
itself. The rushing employees, madly trying to satisfy this ogre, find
their lives, their thoughts, passions, energies all shaped and commanded
by this machine.
In the critical definitions of proletarian literature, the missing
element which makes them all incomplete is this, man and machine,
man versus machine. The age of the 1930s was so conscious of the
political-economic battle between communist and capitalist theories
that the underlying struggle — the industrialization of all man’s
institutions, indeed of man himself — is easily overlooked and
underestimated. This is the central picture of the proletarian novels.
If man is to be defined as a producer, and surely both theories so see
him, man is himself in a real sense a machine. And this fact his
sentient self must suffer.
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Irving’s

The Sketch Book:
The Failure of Success
James R. Bailey
I.
Irving in 1819: Poised for Success
When Washington Irving began to publish The Sketch Book of
Geoffrey Crayon, Gent, in June 1819, the times were not yet
propitious for an American seeking to be a professional writer.
Despite America’s lively tradition of colonial writing and the
publishing successes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers
such as Anne Bradstreet, Cotton Mather, Jonathan Edwards and
Benjamin Franklin, the new republic offered few rewards to those
who viewed authorship as other than an avocation. The fitful careers
of Edgar A. Poe, Charles Brockden Brown and Irving in the early
nineteenth century illustrate the hardships for the would-be man of
letters; and although Irving, in terms of immediate reward and
critical attention, fared better than his contemporaries, he published
for nearly twenty years before, with The Sketch Book, earning the
income and reputation that established him securely in the literary
profession.'
When the first of the seven numbers of the original edition of The
Sketch Book appeared simultaneously in New York, Boston, Phila
delphia and Baltimore, Irving, who was living in England, had
reached a crux. With his contributions to Salmagundi (1808) and the
publication of A History of New York by Diedrich Knickerbocker
(1809), he had established himself as a wit and a writer of promise and
even as an arbiter of literary fashion in New York. But in the
subsequent decade Irving had published little that was noteworthy.
He had reason to be anxious about the reception of The Sketch Book,
for its failure would likely mark the end of his literary career.^
Personal and professional concerns weighed heavily on Irving
during his fallow period between A History and The Sketch Book.
From 1807 through 1817, he lost by death both parents, his fiancee,
and a sister.^ He also found little professional direction during this
period. His brothers, endeavoring to give freedom for writing, made
him a largely inactive partner with a fifth interest in the family
business, but the freedom led to few literary productions.'* Two
years of editing the Analectic Magazine for Moses Thomas afforded
Irving the opportunity to experiment with reviews, critical essays and
biographical sketches and impressed upon his mind that he was
ill-suited for magazine editing.^ Irving’s decision to return to Europe
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in March 1815 followed the failure oftheAnaleclic and a short period
of service as an aide-de-camp in the New York State Militia near the
end of the War of 1812.*' Irving’s plans for casual journeying from
England to Italy or Greece were dissolved by news of the probable
collapse of the family business. In Liverpool, he did what he could to
restore order to the branch his brother Peter was responsible for and
to try to improve the health and spirits of Peter, but bankruptcy
overtook the business in 1818.’ Despite the thrill of visiting Walter
Scott at Abbotsford and occasional evenings at the theatre in
London, Irving experienced an emotional nadir in the years just
preceding The Sketch Book* It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
necessity brought forth The Sketch Book. Irving’s emotional health
and his professional future were at stake.
In 1819, then, Irving’s campaign lay before him, and he waged his
battle for literary fame with the successive numbers of The Sketch
Book. 1 n addition to the primary concern with making a commercial
success, which by implication meant reaching a larger readership and
hence also being received favorably by reviewers, Irving confronted
important artistic considerations in writing The Sketch Book.
Whether he consciously foresaw them, challenges to his craft and
opportunities for artistic growth awaited him. In a general sense. The
Sketch Book would test whether Irving could grow from a clever
provincial writer to a national or international literary figure. Could
a writer, American bred and trained, find materials and write a style
with cosmopolitan appeal? Could a writer who had earned an early
success with forms and styles essentially of the eighteenth century
invent or adapt forms that would appeal to a modern, which is to say
Romantic, readership?'’
From the early reports, Irving won his battle: the book was a
commercial success and largely a critical one, especially with
American reviewers. (See Section III for a summary of critical
reaction.) With his victory secure, Irving was able to continue his
literary career to become the first really popular American writer.
The Sketch Book may well be his best known book, and certainly its
most important tales, “Rip Van Winkle” and “The Legend of Sleepy
Hollow,” are the two creations by Irving to enter the popular
consciousness. However, even that achievement is lessened by the
fact that most people know those two tales out of context rather than
as part of The Sketch Book, a fact that questions the integrity of the
book. In a larger critical view, it seems that Irving won some minor
skirmishes but failed in the battle. The Sketch Book marked a climax
in Irving’s career, and although he wrote for forty more years, he
advanced only occasionally beyond his achievement in The Sketch
Book and indeed failed to live up to its promise.
10

But that later judgment is one neither Irving nor his public could
anticipate in 1819 when The Sketch Book's first readers began to
delight in Geoffrey Crayon and his moods. As they laughed and wept
over Crayon’s sketches, they may have sensed that Irving was
experimenting with form and style but they would have needed the
completed book before them in order to appreciate the experiments
the author was essaying. Irving’s achievements in The Sketch Book
were not inconsequential, and the book still deserves critical attention.
II.
The Sketch Book: Design and Themes
With critical hindsight, today’s reader sees that the overall design
of the work, its organic quality, is crucial to appreciating Irving’s
artistry in The Sketch Book. The complete title cued the reader as to
the nature of the book: The Sketch Book oj Geojfrey Crayon, Gent.
With this, Irving indicated the loose and variable nature of the
contents, which would emphasize descriptions of different scenes
from life, and he indicated that an important unifying device was to
be the relationship of the sketches to a central consciousness, that of a
fictional traveler. Crayon. The book, then, was to break with the
author’s past, with the topical satire of Salmagundi and the mock
history of Knickerbocker. The new work was to be an open-ended
project, a more ambitious and difficult undertaking. Its problem was
how to offer a variety of fare to please many palates and yet create a
whole with advancing themes.
The device of a fictional narrator and the kind of character that
Irving creates in Crayon are noteworthy. Whereas the burlesque A
History of New York is the property of the quirky, old-fashioned
Dutchman, Knickerbocker, the sketches of Crayon are clearly the
property of a contemporary American traveler, identified as a
gentleman. The Crayon persona is more nearly a projection of
Irving’s own personality than is the Knickerbocker persona (who is,
after all, in the tradition of eighteenth-century literary jokes).
Knickerbocker is a source of fun, both as a grotesque invention and
as a narrator who fails to get the satiric point of the tale he tells.
Crayon is witty but also often melancholy; he is a Romantic man of
feeling, and it is through using this persona as the central conscious
ness in The Sketch Book that Irving moved his writing closer to the
prevailing literary taste.
As to the fictional framework. Crayon is the genteel American
moving throughout England, learning about the ancestral home by
visiting literary and religious shrines, by soaking up local color in
cities and villages and by observing society and its manners. Crayon’s
voice is characteristically polite and deferential although he may
II

speak in an American tone about international relations and indulge
in the American fondness for a tall tale. Crayon is essentially a bland
creation, his companionable congeniality spiced with a bit of satire, a
fair amount of wit, and, for later readers, perhaps an excess of pathos.
1 rving’s artistic control is such that he projects on Crayon none of the
stress and personal anxiety that he was experiencing before and
during the composition of the book. The only sign of the author’s
personal hardships is the gentle melancholy that imbues Crayon s
sensibility.
The most curious quality about Crayon, given the time at which
1 rving wrote and his need to attract a wider American readership,is
his anglophilia. In the original edition, only two of the twenty-eight
pieces are distinctly American in setting and character; all of the
others are English. Moreover, Crayon presents his English sketches
with a tone of approbation, seldom suggesting that life in the old
monarchy might be less appealing than in the new republic. Irving,
however, intuited correctly the mood of his American readership,
apparently eager to have an insider’s view of British scenes and to be
moved by accounts of rural funerals.
Before evaluating I rving’s design in The Sketch Book, one needs to
acknowledge that the work changed as Irving revised it for subsequent
editions. The book’s publishing history is complex but what needs
emphasis here is that the first American edition differed considerably
in contents and order from the Author’s Revised Edition (1848), the
last version that Irving oversaw and hence the basis for most reprints
since. The discussion here begins with the author’s intents as evident
in the first edition and notes Irving’s changes in the English edition
and the 1848 edition."
The first edition, published in seven numbers beginning in June
1819 and concluding in September 1820, contained twenty-eight
sketches (excluding a preliminary prospectus) in a nearly symmetrical
fashion; number one comprised five pieces; number six comprised
three, with the remainder comprising four each. From the beginning,
I rving did not establish a plan to follow meticulously (“The following
writings are published on experiment; should they please they may be
followed by others,’’ he wrote in the original prospectus).However,
he did arrange a fictional framework to guide the whole work — firm
enough to show the direction in which the narrator-traveler would
take the reader, loose enough to allow for shifts in directions and
contents, depending upon public response. Irving’s artistic sense and
businessman’s acumen were at work; since he, not an editor or
publisher, had control of the project, he could expand or contract its
size and shape as he chose.'-’ If early numbers failed, he could
withdraw without further investment; otherwise, he could continue
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publishing separate numbers so long as his materials and talent
supported them. And success of the numbers would help him attract a
publisher to bring out a second edition and perhaps an English
edition.
With an eye to providing a varied but balanced fare, Irving
fabricated an initial number that offered an introduction to Crayon
in “The Author’s Account of Himself,” a descriptive narrative in “The
Voyage,” a serous “literary” essay in “Roscoe,” a sentimental sketch
in “The Wife,” and a fantastic tale in “Rip Van Winkle.” A strong
number, indeed, built to a rousing finish with the story that won Irving
more fame than any other single piece.
The following three numbers exhibited much the same kind of
generic balance, with variations in tone and effect. In number two,
Irving led off with a controversial topic, the relationship of England
and the United States, in “English Writers on America”; he switched
from patriotism to a quiet look at manners in “Rural Life in England”
and then to a sentimental anecdote in “The Broken Heart” before
finishing with a satirical literary sketch, “The Art of Book Making.”
In number three, he used a similar mix of tones but with greater
emphasis on the literary past as subject: “A Royal Poet” puts forth an
antiquarian literary subject; “The Country Church” is a humorous
sketch about rural society; “The Widow and Her Son” is an
unabashedly sentimental anecdote; “The Boar’s Head Tavern, East
Cheap” re-establishes a light mood as Crayon goes in search of
Falstaff’s London. Number four has much the same tonal variety but
is dominated by its final piece, the narrative “The Spectre Bride
groom,” a felicitous parody of a Gothic tale. Preceding the tale are a
literary fantasy in “The Mutability of Literature,” a pathetic descrip
tion in “Rural Funerals,” and the brief “The Inn Kitchen,” the
function of which is to introduce (in the manner of Scott in his
Waverley novels) the spectral tale.''*
In the last three numbers, Irving introduced greater variations.
Number five departed from the usual pattern in having a unified,
continuing subject, Christmas customs, for all four pieces and in
being in the narrative mode, more or less, throughout. Even so, the
number has generic variety (the essay of manners in “Christmas,” the
description of character types in “The Stage Coach”), and the
narrative of the holiday that Crayon spends at Bracebridge Hall is
really less important than the finely detailed drawing of customs and
personages (the Old Squire; the Dickensian Master Simon). Were it
not for “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow” in number six, all of the
materials after the Christmas number would seem anti-climactic, and
even so, the last two numbers are slacker than the previous five. To go
with the finely controlled comic description and narrative of Ichabod
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Crane’s story, Irving lines up only the mild satirical allegory, “John
Bull,” and the weepy narrative, “The Pride of the Village,” for
number six. The final number suffers even greater imbalance of genre
and tone. “Little Britain,” the conclusion to the first edition, is a
charming, whimsical narrative about London but is weakened by
following two rather standard tourist pieces, “Westminster Abbey”
and “Stratford-on-Avon,” between which comes the derivative “The
Angler.” Irving’s initial design of offering in each number variety and
balance among subjects, genres and tones had fallen apart before he
completed the last numbers.
Irving had a firm artistic grasp on his materials in the first numbers
but he let it slacken over the months he gave to preparing his
manuscripts and fretting about their progress from London to New
York. Irving, who began to revise the first numbers even before the
last were published, was artist enough to see flaws in the seven
numbers taken as an integer, and he corrected some weaknesses in the
two volume English edition and the single volume Author’s Revised
Edition. He improved balance by moving forward one travel piece,
“Westminster Abbey,” and by saving “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow”
for a strong finish. This arrangement also strengthened symmetry by
putting one major narrative (“Rip Van Winkle”) early in the book,
another (“The Spectre Bridegroom”) at about midpoint, and the
longest and best written narrative at the conclusion. These improve
ments were somewhat negated by the decision to include in later
editions two essays (“Traits of Indian Character,” “Philip of
Pokanoket”) reclaimed from the Analeclic and used in The Sketch
Book with no effort to relate them to Crayon or to the book’s
design. 15
The Sketch Book, for all its multiplicity of subjects and shifts in
tone, is a qualified success because of Crayon’s presence and the
author’s skill in using a variety of genres and fitting pieces together in
a larger design. Irving added coherence to the miscellaneous nature of
the book by working a few major themes throughout, most impor
tantly the theme of mutability. A favorite theme of English Romantic
poets, the mutability theme as Irving develops it plays with the
paradoxes of time and change, with irreconcilable forces of growth
and decay, of loss and gain through time. Many of Irving’s images of
mutability suggest how time transforms us without our consent or
awareness. The book’s premise, with a traveler from the New World
reflecting on scenes from the Old World, lent itself to the mutability
theme, and Irving executed both serious and comic turns on the
theme.
The mutability theme is initiated through several images in the first
number, first of all in a serio-comic epigraph from Lyly’s Euphues
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that describes a snail who wanders away, leaving its home behind,
and so is transformed into a toad. Then, in “The Author s Account of
Himself,” Crayon explains his desire to travel: “My native country
was full of youthful promise; Europe rich in the accumulated
treasures of age. Her very ruins told the history of times gone by, and
every moldering stone was a chronicle.”'*’ Valuing age over youth and
cultural ripeness over a scene offering only promise. Crayon will
pursue his Old World origins, despite knowing that he may like Lyly’s
traveler in Euphues be “transformed into so monstrous a shape that
he is faine to alter his mansion with his manners and to live where he
can, not where he would.”*’
In a sense. Crayon is traveling backward through time, to find the
origins of the mutant, the American, and Irving, tongue-in-cheek,
exploits this side of his theme (while also anticipating his serious
statement in “English Writers on America” about the pretensions of
English travelers). Still offering an account of himself. Crayon
explains his desire to see the great men of Europe;
. . . for 1 had read in the works of various philosophers,
that all animals degenerated in America, and man among
the number; . . . and in this idea 1 was confirmed by
observing the comparative importance and swelling magni
tude of many English travellers among us; who, 1 was
assured, were very little people in their own country. — 1
will visit that land of wonders, thought 1, and see the
gigantic race from which I am degenerated."*
This satiric thrust may be recalled by the reader when Crayon later
offers sentimental English vistas featuring quaint villages and rural
churchyards. Hardly the land of giants.
Irving’s images advance the mutability theme, especially the
suddenness with which fortune changes to misfortune, in “The
Voyage”; here the voyagers, enjoying the ocean’s calm monotony, are
reminded of human vulnerability by an anonymous wreck: “It proved
to be a mast of a ship that must have been completely wrecked; for
there were the remains of handkerchiefs, by which some of the crew
had fastened themselves to the spar to prevent their being washed off
by the waves. There was no trace by which the name of the ship could
be ascertained.”"* The literal image suggests a metaphoric application
that varies the comic edge of Lyly’s epigraph. Like the transformed
snail and the anonymous travelers lost at sea, the wandering Crayon
may lose his distinctiveness, his Americanness.
In “Roscoe” Irving put aside the comedy of the opening and the
melodrama of “The Voyage” but adhered to the mutability theme.
“Roscoe” is in praise of heroic response to mistreatment by fortune,
with the hero exemplified by William Roscoe, a successful writer who
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failed in business.20 Crayon visits Roscoe’s mansion, now deserted;
“It was like visiting some classic fountain that had once welled its
pure waters — a sacred shade, but finding it dry and dusty with the
lizard and toad brooding over the shattered marbles. ”2' The image of a
ruin, no longer serviceable to humans but now evocative of strong
feeling, is one of many Irving uses in The Sketch Book to suggest an
American’s elegiac response to an older, culturally richer world in
which vitality is ebbing. Crayon is typically more interested in
England’s past than its future.22
In successive numbers of The Sketch Book, Irving continued
variations on the mutability theme, often through images of loss and
ruin and narratives about inexplicable and uncontrollable reversals
of fortune. Sentimental versions of the theme include “A Broken
Heart,” “The Widow and Her Son,” and “The Pride of the Village,”
all of which advance the idea of feminine fragility, irreparably injured
by emotional betrayal or loss. These, along with “Rural Funerals,”
abound in sad images of lives ended before fulfillment.
Keeping an eye on the playful side of his theme as begun in the
opening number, Irving explores the humorous consequences of time
and change in “The Art of Book Making,” “Little Britain,” “The
Mutability of Literature,” the Old Squire and Master Simon sections
of the Christmas sketches, and especially in “Rip Van Winkle.” The
latter, though not actually typical of the humor in The Sketch Book
and unusually fine in its narrative art and thematic complexity, is the
best example of Irving’s playfully ambivalent treatment of change
and progress.23
Pivotal to the tale’s meanings is what has happened during Rip’s
twenty-year sleep in the Kaatskills, a period spanning the Revolu
tionary War and the founding of the republic. The ne’er-do-well is a
loyal British citizen, willing to drink the health of his king, when he
falls asleep, but he awakens to find that his personal and public life
have been “improved,” the former by the death of his shrewish wife,
the latter by the transformation of the colony to a state in a new
nation. By chance. Rip returns on election day and is puzzled by
seeing the new society at work. By the old tavern, now the Union
Hotel with its picture of George 111 crudely repainted as General
Washington, Rip sees a crowd of unfamiliar citizens:
The very character of the people seemed changed. There
was a busy, bustlingdisputatious tone about it, instead of
the accustomed phlegm and drowsy tranquility. He
looked in vain for the sage Nicholas Vedder with his
broad face, double chin and fair long pipe, uttering clouds
of tobacco smoke instead of idle speeches. Or Van
Brummel the schoolmaster doling forth the contents of an
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ancient newspaper. In place of these a lean bilious looking
fellow with his pockets full of hand bills, was haranguing
vehemently about rights of citizens — elections —
members of Congress — liberty — Bunker’s hill — heroes
of seventy-six — and other words which were a perfect
babylonish jargon to the bewildered Van Winkle.2“*
And after the villagers hear Rip’s magical story, accepting or rejecting
it according to their temperament, they quietly “returned to the more
important concerns of the election.
However, Rip, soon regaining his role in the village through his
daughter’s help, is much less concerned with republican virtue and
vice than with the cessation of “petticoat government.” Rip’s
character, the denouement suggests, is little altered by his experiences
or by time which has, however, improved the old man’s situation,
since Rip, “... being arrived at that happy age when a man can be idle,
with impunity,” is viewed as a patriarch, as a relic that now evokes
nostalgia rather than contempt.
As to the matter of progress in the new age, Irving lets the story
remain ambiguous. The narration proceeds through Rip’s perceptions,
and certainly he has doubts about progress wrought by the Revolu
tion. The former colonists have become American citizens, a concept
Rip does not understand, and their chief activity is quarreling over
party affiliations. Moreover, the image presiding over them is merely
the old king touched up to look like the new president. The changes
discernible to Rip are in manners, not in substance, and do not
necessarily indicate progress. But finally Irving leaves to the readers,
as to the new generation of Rip’s village, the options of accepting
Rip’s story and judgments or dismissing him as a harmless lunatic
and a relic of another time.
Just as Irving chooses not to resolve the theme of mutability in
Rip’s story, so finally he leaves unresolved the theme in The Sketch
Book. His method is to offer kaleidoscopic views rather than a final
vision. With a twist of the instrument, the author reveals the pathos of
the funeral procession for the maiden in “Rural Funerals,” then the
whimsical scene in which a forgotten book quizzes Crayon about the
reputation of the upstart Shakespeare in “The Mutability of Litera
ture,” and then in “Little Britain” the comic lament for a place whose
manners are destroyed by the rivalry of the Misses Lambs and
Trotters. Although Irving suggests much about mutability (e.g. love
is the only antidote for mortality but at the same time is the most
perishable of feelings, imagination and art are a means of denying
change and decay, the New World must surely overtake the Old but
that shift in power is not automatically progress), he avoids a
definitive thematic treatment and in the process enriches the book.
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For today’s reader. The Sketch Book and its reception by its first
audience raise some interesting contradictions. It has earned the
reputation of being one of the first important literary works in
America’s national literature; it was popular at its first appearance
and it was well received by American reviewers. Yet The Sketch Book
is oddly English in its materials and its emotional appeal, and the
modern reader’s curiosity is piqued by the fact that Irving reached so
many American readers with a book that showed much more about
American attitudes toward England than it revealed about American
life. Fashions in literature, such as the Byronism that encouraged
posturing amidst romantic landscapes, may account for the immediate
popularity of Crayon’s sentimental scene painting, but surely the
American readers of the 1820s and ’30s responded to more than that
in The Sketch Book. One hypothesis is that the U nited States, having
asserted itself against England in the War of 1812, was emotionally
ready for a sentimental view of the motherland, especially a view in
which images suggested, as many of Irving’s did, a place of past glory,
of quaint customs, of beautiful scenes which fed the emotions without
challenging the intellect. Another possible explanation is that by the
1820s and ’30s, Americans, rather dazed by a period of economic
growth and geographical expansion and in reaction to rapid social
changes, felt a need to stabilize their world, to anchor themselves
emotionally and intellectually. A work such as The Sketch Book,
connecting the nation with its ancentral origins, often sentimentally,
and dealing with mutability but in a much less threatening way than
the actual conditions about them, fed the needs of the readership.
Irving had written in The Sketch Book not the best work that he
could have but the right book for the times.
III.
The Critical Response

Contemporary reviewers in the United States and Great Britain
had much to say about The Sketch Book. Americans differed from
their fellow reviewers in London and Edinburgh by rather consistently
over praising the work; nevertheless, most reviewers were positive
about Irving’s new work although they seldom agreed as to which
pieces, aside from the tales of Rip Van Winkle and Ichabod Crane,
were best in subject and style.
The contemporary reviews remind us of the literary and political
scene of the 1820s, and many, especially the long essays in magazines,
tell us as much about the temper of the times and the biases of the
writers as they do about Irving’s artistry. American and British
reviewers often touched on the same points but their responses are
sufficiently different to make it useful to consider them separately.
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R.H. Dana’s essay in The North American Review (September
1819), although longer and more detailed than the usual American
review and although it deals with only the first two numbers, can
illustrate typical concerns. Dana addresses first of all the state of
American writing and is eager to call attention to works that may
boost the reputation of a national literature. He identifies Irving as
author of some
Salmagundi papers and A History of New York
and gives several pages to the early works, justifying the backward
glance by noting “the intention we have all along had of noticing most
of such American books, whether of a later or earlier date, as may add
to our literary character.Then, mindful of objectivity, he adds:
“We shall examine a work without any home feelings — our only
business is with its merits and faults,” continuing with a warning
against literary chauvinism and a reminder of the paucity of
American books with literary merit.Dana discusses at length what
may improve the quality of American writing; he suggests the need
for an educated middle class — “men of improved intellects who are
laboring in the different callings of public life” — and for better
education (i.e. education less dependent on classical writers and that
exposes readers to recent writers).-’®
Returning to The Sketch Book, Dana finds Irving’s style less
pleasing than in earlier writing. “It was masculine — good bone and
muscle — this is feminine, dressy, elegant and languid,” Dana
observes and then lists some questionable diction and figures.’' In
noticing individual pieces, Dana, like other reviewers and the
consensus of posterity, identifies “Rip Van Winkle” as a favorite. He
finds the sentimental “The Broken Heart” to be “. . . loathesome in
effect.”” Dana is typical in choosing to comment on “English Writers
on America,” agreeing with Irving’s call for more responsible
reporting by English travelers and finding the essay written “... in a
just, liberal, manly spirit, worthy of its author.”” Dana concludes by
emphasizing his larger concern in the essay — the correction of taste
in America so its literary character can grow.
Dana’s essay is a more thoughtful and careful evaluation of Irving’s
work and its relation to the literary scene than many other critical
notices. The tone of American reviews often suggests puffery rather
than serious criticism. The need to find a praiseworthy national
literature clouded critical judgment.
On the whole, British reviewers gave more thoughtful and
balanced reactions to The Sketch Book (they also usually had the
advantage of having the complete English edition before them);
however, the British reviewers brought their own biases to the work,
biases most frequently unmasked when the essayists addressed the
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idea of an American literature and the specific essay, “English
Writers on America.” A review-essay in a British magazine begins
typically with a consideration of why America has produced so little
in belles-lettres and then introduces Irving as one American writer
with literary merit. The review usually comments on “English Writers
on America,” praises “Rip Van Winkle,” and offers extracts or entire
sketches to illustrate Irving’s style and subjects.The British review is
more likely than the American to criticize Irving’s use of English
materials and his handling of them. Interestingly, the British reviews
divide sharply in finding individual English sketches charming or
tiresome, but they are virtually unanimous in praising the two tales
with American settings and characters. It seems the British readership
was as eager to have American stories as Americans were to read
genteel sketches about England.
The essay calling forth the most emotional responses from all
reviewers was “English Writers on America,” an equivocation on
Irving’s part since he urges Americans to pay no heed to what English
travelers say about the state of American society at the same time he
urges the English to act responsibly as the “fountain head from
whence the literature of the language flows,” a situation making
England the source of much information accessible to Americans.^*
The essay also carries an implicit threat in its contrast of a virile,
young United States with an aging England. Although Irving’s
intention was to encourage conciliation, his tone is sometimes
hectoring.
The British Critic’s review (June 1820) of volume one of The
Sketch Book contains the most vocal response to “English Writers on
America.”37 Whereas other critics often seconded the call for
conciliation and ignored the more blustery passages in the essay, the
Critic saw a red flag and charged. Much of the review is an eloquent
chastisement of the United States for fighting against England in the
War of 1812. Since by all ties the United States should have sided with
England “against the usurper of France,” but since the States put
commerce before honor, “the Americans have no right to the
friendship and good opinion of Englishmen.Americans, the Critic
continues, should not complain of the writers of Great Britain “but of
those miserable demagogues who have so long guided public opinion
on the other side of the Atlantic.However, in spite of the rhetoric,
the reviewer does not disagree with Irving’s basic claim that English
writers often treat America unfairly, and with a burst of nineteenthcentury imperial pride, the Critic hails the day “when the English
language, and English literature and laws, will cover so large a
portion of the habitable globe.”'"’ In another response, the reviewer in
the Quarterly Review (April 1821), although falling short of the
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eloquence and indignation of the Critic and generally agreeing with
Irving on “English Writers on America,” urges America to lose its
“over-weening self-conceit” and to cease bragging about its constitu
tion, especially while allowing slavery within its republican bounds/'
One should note, however, that even while British periodicals
sometimes used essays to address subjects only secondary to Irving’s
achievements in The Sketch Book, the critics generally seriously
reviewed the book (The British Critic gave separate reviews to
volumes one and two) and were more balanced in their comment and
more constructive in their criticism than American reviewers. For
example, the Quarterly Review praised “Rip Van Winkle,” “The
Spectre Bridegroom,” and “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow” above all
else and concluded that Irving was best with narration, a Judgment
Irving might have taken more seriously.John G. Lockhart, writing
in Blackwood's (July 1820), suggested that Irving’s future lay in
writing a novel of American manners, a course that was probably
precluded by Irving’s residency in Europe from 1815 to 1832.“^
Despite its lecture on America’s failings, the Critic praised many
individual pieces in both volumes and suggested Irving should rely
less on the sentimental strain, a piece of constructive criticism echoed
by other reviewers. For all the literary chauvinsim expressed by the
British reviewers, they gave serious attention to The Sketch Book,
often hailing it as the first ray in the dawning of an American
literature and frequently providing relevant criticism.
IV.
The Sketch Book: 160 Years After
The Sketch Book is a significant American book, the success of
which came at an important time in its author’s career. Because of the
collapse of the family business, Irving needed a financial success if he
were to continue in the literary profession; and because of the grief he
felt from the family failure and his personal losses in the preceding
period, Irving needed the emotional lift that could come from
popular and critical approval of his work. Given these circumstances
and the fact that The Sketch Book followed his youthful success with
A History of New York by a decade. The Sketch Book was crucial in
Irving’s career. Thus, in the 1820s, he had reason to be pleased with
the book’s reception, and indeed for the rest of his life and beyond,
the book’s popularity endured, going through countless printings.
Beyond the importance of the book to the author’s economic and
emotional well-being, it was a significant artistic achievement,
perhaps a greater achievement than Irving himself understood. The
Sketch Book is more than its parts. Through developing Crayon as
persona, through artfully arranging diverse materials (i.e. Irving’s
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skillful balancing of essays of place, sentimental narratives, fanciful
tales, etc.), and through advancing major themes such as mutability,
Irving created an innovative book, one that moved his literary art
beyond A History of New York, essentially a continuation of
eighteenth-century form and style. The Sketch Book is informed by a
sensibility and style that are Romantic. And even though The Sketch
Book has many connections with English literature and stylists, it is a
work quite different from any previous American book. Critics who
saw The Sketch Book as a beacon, potentially heralding a new age in
American letters, were not amiss.
Irving, however, eventually failed to fulfill the promise signified in
his book. Although he employed some of the formal innovations in
his next two books, Bracebridge Hal! (1822) and Tates of a Traveller
(1824), his artistic advancements were slight and the works seemed
imitative and lifeless. He experimented further with thematic group
ing; he continued to use Crayon as persona in Bracebridge Hall; he
searched further for antiquarian and folk materials such as those that
pleased readers of The Sketch Book, but his accomplishments were
less. Only years later did he achieve a similar success with The
Alhambra (1832) when he found materials that engaged his
imagination.
Why Irving failed to seize the promise of The Sketch Book and
develop artistically is a difficult and perhaps unanswerable question.
Perhaps it was a matter of the temperament (one of those Lords of
Life Emerson identifies in “Experience”) of an amiable man, content
to do less than his best, and often drifting into hack work. Such is
certainly the picture that Stanley Williams paints in his detailed
biography. It is true that Irving lacked discipline, was easily
distracted, and was most productive when necessity ruled him as in
the case of The Sketch Book or when circumstances buffered him
from the social world.
But beyond the matter of temperament is the question of the artist
and his materials. An American living in Europe for long periods,
I rving was a regular observer of scenes, a recorder of anecdotes, and a
reader of old volumes in search of ideas for his writing. He was not,
given the results, especially discriminating in selecting subjects, and
in retrospect, he seems to have been an artist with an exceptional sense
of form and style who seldom found the materials to complement that
sense. This is perhaps another way of saying Irving’s real failure was
in imagination and discrimination. The fame of “Rip Van Winkle”
and “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow” adds an ironic emphasis. These
tales, traditional materials adorned in scenes and recollections from
Irving’s youth, have eclipsed not only the rest of The Sketch Book but
virtually everything else he wrote. The tales illustrate the excellence of
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Irving’s prose when subject, form, and style merge in the comple
mentary whole. Irving failed to understand that in these tales and in
the entire design of The Sketch Book he had created the foundation
upon which to build his career as the foremost writer of the new
nation.
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major images and themes in The Sketch Book and strains to demonstrate a
Jeffersonian agrarian bias in the imagery.
-’“Rip Van Winkle,"especially its sources, has more critical literature than anything
else by Irving, For a clear account of Irving’s debt to German folklore in his tale and his
artistic use ol the source, see Henry A. Pochmann, “Irving’s German Sources in The
Sketch Book,"Studies in Philology, 27 (1930), 477-507.
-‘Sketch Book, p. 37,
■^Sketch Book, p. 40.
^'•Sketch Book, p. 40.
^’Lorman A. Ratner, “American Nationalism Fifty Years After the Revolution" in
Washington Irving: A Tribute, ed. Andrew B. Myers (Tarrytown: Sleepy Hollow
Restorations, 1972), p. 44.
■"North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal, 9(1819), 323. An unsigned
review attributed to R.H. Dana by Haskell Springer in Washington Irving: A
Reference Guide (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1976).
^‘‘North American Review, 323.
'“North American Review, 328.
"North American Review, 348.
"North American Review, 352.
"North American Review, 354. The reviewer in The Western Review and
Miscellaneous Magazine, 2 (1820), 244-254, also approved of the essay, saying it
“abounds in Just sentiments and liberal feelings."
’■•Williams, Life, 1, 174-175, 188-191, summarizes many contemporary reviews.
Springer, A Reference Guide, lists reviews and gives synopses.
’’Without an international copyright agreement to hinder them, English publishers
began reprinting items from the first numbers in 1819, thereby encouraging Irving to
prepare an English edition.
'“Sketch Book, p. 47,
’’Unsigned review. The British Critic, NS 13 (1820), 643-654.
'"British Critic, 647.
'“British Critic, 647.
“"British Critic, 648.
■"Unsigned review. Quarterly Review, 25 (1821), 52-54.
"Quarterly Review, 66-67.
“'Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 1 (1820), 367-368, An unsigned review of the
2nd edition of A History of New York but also with comment on The Sketch Book,
Attributed to Lockhart by Springer, A Reference Guide,
•■•A case in point is the composition of The Life and Covages of Christopher
Columbus (1828), which Irving worked on assiduously in Madrid, using the library of
Obadiah Rich and enjoying the patronage of American diplomat, Alexander Hill
Everett. See Williams, Life, I, 302-325.
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History on Trial:
The Case of the
Coadjutor’s
Chalices
Sylvia Vance
There is a fundamental ambiguity in the very name of the discipline
I want to discuss — history. On the one hand it is the events of the
past; on the other, it is the recounting of those events. This duality is
readily reconciled at a level of common sense. When 1 ask a history
class of mine what is the task of the historian, I frequently get the
answer “To tell us what really happened.” And of course the students
are right, though I sometimes delight in showing them, in instances
from my own research, how clouded an issue “what really happened”
can be. My favorite small-scale example has to do with JeanFran^ois-Paul de Gondi, the mid-seventeenth-century coadjutor of
Paris (that is, the ecclesiastical assistant to the archbishop) and
whether or not he proposed in January 1649 that the silver services of
the churches of Paris be melted down in order to pay troops rebelling
against royal authority during the Fronde. If true, this would
constitute a serious charge against a high ecclesiastical figure (Gondi
subsequently during the rebellion became a cardinal — the cardinal
de Retz). While 1 was working on Gondi’s (that is, Retz’s) memoirs, 1
became intrigued by the question of the validity of this charge
formally made against him by the young Louis XIV and his prime
minister Mazarin in July of 1655, as they sought to invoke the pope’s
discipline against this important rebel who had served what turned
out to be a losing cause.
Seeking out the evidence in many letters, memoirs, and pamphlets
of that period, 1 found conflicting sorts of statements from people
known to be Retz’s enemies — that, for example, Gondi had offered
the treasury funds of the cathedral chapter, or that he had offered the
chalices and the crucifixes - but none agreed on the time or the place
or the terms of the offers. Retz himself, in his later memoirs (written
in the 1670s) understandably says nothing of any such proposal of
his. One essentially neutral source, D’Ormesson, a well-respected
associate of the Paris Parlement, says in his memoirs simply that at
the Parlementary session of 21 January 1649, “Monsieur le Coadjuteur offered his silver service.” Such phrasing suggests that it was his
own personal silver he was offering, not that of the churches. Did
Coadjutor Gondi offer to have the ecclesiastical silver melted down to
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pay troops? 1 don’t know; I maintain that the positive evidence is a bit
suspect, and 1 don’t think we can yet say “what really happened’’ in
this regard in January 1649. The winners frequently structure the
record, blatantly or more subtly shaping the story.
Story — history. In French they are the same word, and we are
back to our fundamental duality. In recent years, the discipline of
history has been characterized by many expansive developments
—quantification of historical data, expansion of perceived spatial
ties to world-wide proportions, the relating of subjective experience
to external events, and the exploration of latent history (those
developments which their own age did not perceive happening). But
its most lively debate is one that has called into serious question how
objective, how “true” the narrative of historical accounts can be. And
I think that the sometimes acrimonious scholarly conflict has served
to show that it makes a great deal of difference which aspect of the
duality in the definition, in the word “history,” is being stressed. How
greatly is “what really happened” inevitably compromised in the
telling?
It is not the first time by any means that the objective truth of
history has been questioned. In fact, Retz wrote his memoirs in the
perspective that as a seventeenth-century nobleman he distrusted
what the professional “vulgar” — that is, bourgeois — historians
wrote. Their account was, said Retz, much too neat, too arranged, in
a word, too literary. History is really disorder and confusion and
contradiction. And by the way, Retz can be considered an authority
on historical contradiction; in his own day he was charged with
having changed sides six times during the Fronde rebellion.
You as readers may be wondering by now why I, with a doctorate
in French literature, am discussing the discipline of history. My
doctoral program had been designed with a field in early modern
European history because I knew from the beginning of that work
that I wanted to examine the realm where literature and history can
be seen to encounter each other. Mirabile dictu, I persuaded the
graduate committee to agree. So, along with the wealth of French
literature and history, 1 studied the analytical strategies of both
disciplines in order to apply them to seventeenth-century French
memoirs. A lifelong fascination with French literature and French
history was formally expressed in a dissertation, completed in 1980,
on the memoirs of the cardinal de Retz.
It was while I was searching for a fruitful way to amalgamate
analytical techniques from both disciplines that I encountered the
work of Hayden White, most importantly, his 1973 Metahistory: The
Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. This im
portant book had been characterized by a review in Diacritics —
26

typical of many — as “more than a study of philosophies of history —
a methodological manifesto, a more sustained argument for a
deep-figural hermeneutic than has been worked out anywhere before
now.” Since then, in the past ten years, his work, continued in articles
and in the book Tropics of Discourse, has also brought forth such
charges as that he, in company with the semioticians, “means to offer
a more radical form of subversion, a veritable Gotterdammerung of |
reason, in which history’s (destroyed) purpose is (thenj restored by its '
capacity to play a hero’s role.”^
i
In short, Hayden White has been, and remains, controversial. To
see why. I’d like to examine with you briefly what his analytical
technique is, and how it served me in analyzing Retz’s memoirs, as
one approach to them. Then 1 will trace the high points of a carefully
reasoned critique of such approaches as that of Hayden White made
by Maurice Mandelbaum in his The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge.
Both men write from an effort to (as the French would say) situate the
discipline of history. I think that the structures generated by the two
writers show very clearly the ambiguity of the word that names it.
White emphasizes what is involved in “telling us”; Mandelbaum
focuses our attention on the importance of “what really happened,”
and he defends the truth and objectivity (in a precise sense) of
historical knowledge. 1 think that we can agree that Hayden White
has indeed undermined objectivity in that precise sense, for the sake
of what he has envisioned as philosophically more compelling.
In an important issue of XVIT Siecle, the journal of the French
Society for the Study of the Seventeenth Century, Yves Coirault in
1971 was sounding this tone, as had Hegel and Croce in earlier
generations. Introducing that series of articles on seventeenthcentury memoirs, as studied by an important and productive group of
French historians, Coirault said, “...given the impurity of history, the
poetics (poetique) of the work, its discourse, is necessarily literature.”*
In a nutshell, this position is what Hayden White has systematically
developed. His basic philosophical concern is (as he puts it) “the
problem of the relationship among description, analysis, and ethics in
the human sciences”* — a Kantian division of the human faculties.
I’d like to quote some of White’s words addressed particularly to
the discipline of history: “It now seems possible to hold that an
explanation need not be assigned unilaterally to the category of the
literally truthful on the one hand or the purely imaginary on the
other, but can be judged solely in terms of the richness of the
metaphors which govern its sequence of articulation. Thus envisaged,
the governing metaphor of an historical account could be treated as a
heuristic rule which self-consciously eliminates certain kinds of data
from consideration as evidence.”^ And here is White on what we ask
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of an historian:
... there is no such thing as a single correct view of any
object under study but...there are many correct views,
each requiring its own style of representation...we should
no longer naively expect that statements about a given
epoch or complex of events in the past ‘correspond’ to
some preexistent body of ‘raw facts.’ For we should
recognize that what constitutes the facts themselves is the
problem that the historian, like the artist, has tried to
solve in the choice of the metaphor by which he orders his
world, past, present, and future. We should ask only that
the historian show some tact in the use of his governing
metaphors.®
Here we pause for breath, and head back to my non-theoretical,
very real classroom and its students, and imagine the more perceptive
among them saying, “But where has ‘what really happened’ gone if
this is what we ask of historians?” Where, indeed? But 1 think you can
see how 1 here envisioned one possibly fruitful technique to use in
analyzing Retz’s memoirs, to get at his writing of history in ways that
do not have to surrender necessarily when a question cannot be
answered. This was important to me, for there is a major question in
Retz s political past which we cannot — at least not yet — answer, a
question much more weighty than the church silver, and that
question involves the legitimacy of the whole Frondeur cause during
the rebellion. Was it narrowly based on the self-interest of the nobles?
Louis XIV and Mazarin attempted to destroy every bit of evidence
that would document anything else, anything more politically
legitimate. Retz wrote his memoirs in part to say that there was a solid
rationale to the Fronde rebellion, and that Retz had stood for it and
expressed it in theory and act. But we know that Retz was
opportunistic and ambitious, and the question becomes. How can we
possibly deal now with his “evidence,” cognizant of his shifting points
of view, with all of this complicated by the fact that he wrote his
memoirs some twenty-five years after the events? Documentation
fails us at many a point.
I had turned to Hayden White’s methods as one approach to Retz’s
history. White says, as Yves Coirault had done, that because the
narrative of history is inevitably literary, a historian tells a story of a
particular kind which (echoing Northrop Frye’s anatomical terms)
White named as Romance, Comedy, Tragedy, Satire. White added
that the historian also tends to use a relatively consistent mode of
explanation (and here the borrowing is from Stephen Pepper):
Idiographic (or Formist), Organicist, Mechanistic, Contextualist.®
Besides that. White finds it inevitable that the historian works from
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within a certain ideology (Anarchist, Conservative, Radical, Liberal)
as Karl Mannheim presented those classifications in Ideology and
Utopia. Furthermore, White maintains that there is one other set of
modes as well, underlying all the others: “1 have been forced to
postulate a deep level of consciousness on which a historical thinker
chooses conceptual strategies by which to explain or represent his
data. On this level, 1 believe, the historian performs an essentially
poetic act, in which he prefigures the historical field...” These
prefigurations White categorizes with the familiar literary terms of
metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.
Reduced to lists, all this looks very pat and perhaps sterile, but
examining textual materials through this structure did prove to be
useful in the case of the memoirs 1 was interested in analyzing.
Hayden White had worked with the approach primarily on nineteenthcentury historians, in his notable Metahistory. 1 modified his
procedures in two ways. After some preliminary experimentation 1
divided Retz’s 1000-page text into some fifty sections of varying
length as suited his narrative, and examined each one separately at an
early stage of the operation, rather than treating the work as a whole
right from the start. The second modification: 1 had to change
White’s ideological categories to those political viewpoints which
suited seventeenth-century France — that is, a first one characterized
as feudal, held by the traditional nobility; a second, mainly
championed by the Parlementary magistrates, the officials, and their
supporters, which Ernst Kossmann termed Baroque; and a third one
that 1 ended up calling, none too succinctly, “providential statist
absolutism,” representing the rationale supporting an increasingly
bureaucratic system run by a divine right monarch.
Now, to make a long story short, the use of White’s categories of
analysis — as thus modified — brought about several helpful new
insights on Retz’s memoir text. It demonstrated how Retz moved in
his account from structuring by feudal ideology to structuring from a
Baroque view at precisely those episodes of the Fronde when his own
role was most suspect, according to the standards of the victorious
monarchy of the 1670s, the era when Retz composed the narrative.
White’s techniques exposed an important metaphor from French
historical experience which characterizes certain parts of Retz’s text,
and highlighted as well an underlying irony which disappears only,
interestingly enough, when the Baroque ideological view predomi
nates. The analysis showed how Retz’s very strategies of narration
support his view that history is really disorder and confusion and
contradiction. All that is useful for understanding “what really
happened” after the defeat of the mid-century Frondeur groups,
insofar as that defeat contributed to the stability of Louis XIV’s
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absolutism.
But using White’s procedures, useful as they were, also served to
illuminate the limitations of his approach, for nothing 1 did with them
could answer that evidential sort of question which is of major
importance: Did Retz as a rebelling Frondeur really have, at the time
of the Fronde, a politically responsible point of view? This question,
while not essential in understanding the older memoir writer Retz, is
essential in understanding the historical Retz of the mid-seventeenth
century. In the same sense that 1 cannot now answer the question of
the church silver, 1 can’t answer this one either. I’m a good bit closer
than I was, and I do have an educated guess, but I can’t answer it. By
bits and pieces, historians such as Richard Bonney are at present
combing such documents as escaped destruction from the Fronde
period, especially in provincial archives. Perhaps the question is
ultimately answerable, perhaps not.
This limitation inherent in White’s analytical techniques leads us to
Maurice Mandelbaum’s framework for discussing historical know
ledge, one which very clearly says that current attempts (such as
Hayden White’s) to identify history with narrative or discourse are
mistaken. When Retz had diagnosed similar shortcomings in the
historical writing of his day and sought to correct them in his own, his
argument was thatrca/ history (“what really happened”), rather than
being governable by the clarity of classical narration, forms a
“monstrous body” in its disorder and confusion — a marvelously
Baroque image from a quintessential Baroque personality.
Maurice Mandelbaum, when challenged by the current attempt to
identify history with narrative, structures an argument that seeks to
demonstrate the reality of hard-won objective “truth” in historical
writing — that objectivity which he, and others, refuse to surrender to
White’s brilliant but (to their minds) diversionary strategy.
To follow Mandelbaum’s argument we need a sense of his
terminology and his categories, and 1 invite your attention here to the
differences of voeabulary and of tone from those of Hayden White.
Mandelbaum reminds us of that commonplace in historiographical
writing which says that historians are concerned with particular
events that occurred at specific times and places, and not with them
only in so far as they represent events of a given type. “H istorians are
concerned with the particular, rather than with establishing explana
tory generalizations.”® Mandelbaum states some essential, generic
characteristics of historical work: (1) it purports to establish what
actually occurred at a particular time and place, or is concerned with
tracing and explaining some particular series of related occurences;
(2) Historical studies depend on inquiry in order to establish the truth
concerning particular events that did actually occur. They must be
30

able to advance external evidence that vouches for their truth;
(3) The historian views human thoughts, feelings, and actions in their
societal setting — that is, in terms of the various ways in which they
affected, or were affected by, the society in which they took place.®
It is important to bear in mind Mandelbaum’s use of the terms
“society” and “culture” in order to understand his basic distinction of
general and special histories:
Society: A society consists of individuals living in an
organized community that controls a particular territory;
the organization is provided by institutions that serve to
define the status of different individuals and the roles they
play in perpeptuating the continuing existence of the
community.
Culture: (not an anthropological use of the term) A
generic term designating whatever objects are created and
used by individuals, and whatever skills, beliefs, and
forms of behavior they have acquired through their social
inheritance.^®
Institutionally oriented histories — that is, societal-based ones
—are “general histories”; histories of specific aspects of culture
(architecture, coffee drinking, what have you) are “special histories.”
Two other important terms in Mandelbaum’s lexicon are scale,
comparable to the varying scales of map making, where a historian
chooses the level of feature and detail he will work with; and facets,
where the historian chooses the aspect or aspects of the subject he will
include.
Mandelbaum classifies three important types of histories within
either general or special historical studies, acknowledging that not
one of them exists as a pure form in historical practice. The first he
terms “sequential,” those studies which follow one series of events.
Mandelbaum cautions, in characterizing this type, “It is misleading
to describe what historians do as if this were comparable to the
storyteller’s art.”^’ The historian cannot follow a simple story line. A
second type of either special or general historical studies he calls
“explanatory.” The historian is here not following one continuous
series of events; he knows, or believes he knows, what in fact
happened, and is seeking to explain.’® The events with which he deals
may not belong together except as they contribute to the particular
outcome which the historian is explaining.
The best way to understand the third major type is by envisioning
the kind of background which a historian might well supply before
developing the sequential or explanatory narrative of the other two
kinds. If the whole study is the description or characterization of a
historical period or an aspect of a period, Mandelbaum calls it
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“interpretive.”’®
Thus, Mandelbaum finds historical studies to be far more diverse,
as he puts it, than is usually assumed, and this diversity is “reflected in
differences between the modes of explanation to be found in them.”’^
Generally speaking, “explanation of the whole will depend upon
understanding the connections that exist in the patterning of its
parts.”’® At this point in his examination of causation, Mandelbaum
begins to sound like parts of White’s study, but the point that
Mandelbaum is here making (implicity to White) is that type of
history (general or special, sequential, explanatory, or interpretive)
will affect how the part and the whole are related more importantly
than will structural considerations of literary discourse.
When is an historical explanation “true”? For Mandelbaum there
are at least three answers, depending on the type of historical study.
In special histories, explanation of characteristics to be found in one
or more cultural works is through recourse to something lying
outside the works themselves (in cultural tradition, or biographical
facts, or societal change, for example).’® It may be found by readers
of that special history that the description of the cultural works may
be adequate and sensitive, but that the explanation offered for what
they have in common may not be appropriately based. Or the
explanation may be judged to be insightful, but the overall validity of
the study is marred by an incomplete or incoherent description,
according to the choice of scale and of facets the historian made. In
short, each of the two parts of a special history — the internal subject
and the outside explanatory agent or agents — can be evaluated
separately. It is probably important to note at this point that
Mandelbaum finds that in special histories, historical objectivity is
limited, if it is even possible.
In general histories of the sequential and explanatory type,
however, the explanation for what happened is given not through
appeal to something outside the events but through deeper penetra
tion into what did actually happen. The events that explain what
occurred are themselves part of the series of occurrences; a false
explanation, then, is one which misrepresents what did occur.In
these types of historical studies, the distinction between “cause” and
“conditions” breaks down, and they cannot be separated in appraising
the “truth” of the account.
In general or special interpretive histories, the adequacy of the
historical work can be measured against the evidence it collects, and
against those points at which its basic principle of collection has led
the historian to overlook other evidence without which the inter
pretive narrative is faulty.’®
Can history be objective? Indeed, it can be, argues Mandelbaum,
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supposing the proper kind of objectivity to be intended in that
question. If two persons make contradictory statements regarding
the same subject matter, whatever test must be used must be directly
applied to what is being affirmed or denied, not to any influences
leading to affirmation or denial. Keeping one’s personal considera
tions from warping one’s judgment does not in itself provide any test
of whether a statement is true or false. And in every field, says
Mandelbaum, the background and knowledge of the investigator will
affect the investigation. But historical knowledge r aw be objective in
the sense that “we regard its truth as excluding the possibility that its
denial can also be true.”^®
On this basis, it is possible to accumulate an increasing, objective,
“true” history, but only if the diverse types of historical writing are
understood. As was noted when we spoke of modes of explanation,
there is some reason, according to Mandelbaum, to doubt that in
special histories objectivity can be obtained, but the same doubt does
not apply to general histories. The reason is that the general historian
cannot exercise freedom in delimiting what will or will not enter the
account. “Once the historian has chosen a subject matter and a
working scale, it is the data that inquiry reveals, rather than the
historian’s own initial concepts, that serve to control the structured
connections of the facts within his account.”®® And they can be
judged for their congruence with the structures of other general
historical accounts, and thus objective history accumulates.
To sum up, Mandelbaum very specifically opposes White’s views
in several basic and important ways, as he states:
(1) “It is not true that sortal principles historians use in classifying
evidence are merely subjective.”
(2) Evidence imposes structure in historical writing.
(3) The more evidence there is, the less choice a historian has as to
alternative ways to structure.
(4) Causal connections are authenticated on the basis of evidence.
(5) “The creativity of a historian is shown in how he handles
evidence and where he has had the insight to look for new evidence.”
(6) “History as a discipline is not a form of art.”®’
Thus, we see that there exist today some very clearcut oppositions
concerning the discipline of history, depending on whether the
“telling us” or the “what really happened” is being emphasized, and
the current dialogue is certainly not the first nor will it be the last. It
seems appropriate here for me to sum up briefly my own critique of
Hayden White, whose approach to history has been important to me,
but which I see as ultimately unsatisfactory and incomplete in
describing or situating the discipline of history. On the positive side.
White does force historians continually to be conscious of and to
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appraise the recounting of events as a non-neutral element of the
discipline. White’s approach does not, 1 think, really threaten us with
a Gotterdammerung of reason or objectivity //it is viewed as what
White in his less exalted moments says it is — a heuristic procedure
which can let us see and say more about certain texts than we
otherwise could. And one wants to remind Mandelbaum here that the
historical evidence so essential in his definition of historical studies is
importantly built from documents and from other histories whose
point of view must be judged. White’s procedures can help us describe
viewpoint; I am convinced of that.
But in the end, I agree with John Carlos Rowe’s telling judgment,
published not long ago in Humanities in Society, that White’s
categorizing an infinite wealth of data in terms of four basic tropes
falsifies diachronic (historical) particulars for the sake of synchronic
(descriptive) abstractions.”*2 1 appreciate this phrasing because it
reminds us of the Saussurian linguistic origins in the current version
of that old duality inherent in “telling us what really happened.”
Notes
'Alfred Louch, “The Discourse of Subversion” in Humanities in Society, Vol. 2, No.
I (Winter 1979), 34.
*No. 94-95, 5.
^Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 22.
^White, Tropics..., p. 46, my emphasis
*White, Tropics..., p. 47.
•White s explanatory modes are perhaps not as familiar in common knowledge as
are the other terms. Included here, therefore, are brief explanations of these modes:
Formism (also termed Idiography by White, from the designation used by Wilhelm
Windelband who provided philosophic defense of the method): the historian sorts out
the various entities in a historical field, serving the function of a sort of magnifying
glass for the reader. What is to be explained is mo re the uniqueness of agents, agencies,
and acts which make up events than the scene against which things happen. Essentially
dispersive in nature. (As Michelet and Carlyle, for example.)
Organicism. the historian tends to depict particulars discerned in the historical field
as components of synthetic processes; he wants to relate the various contexts that are
perceived in the historical record to history-in-general. He searches out principles of
integration. More integrative than Formism, and more reductive. (As Ranke, for
example.)
Mechanism: the historian’s search is for causal laws determining the outcomes of
processes discovered in the historical field. Elements are seen as related in a “part to
part"sense; the historian distinguishes causes and effects among them. Integrative and
reductive. (As Marx and Tocqueville, for example.)
Contextualism: the historian attempts to set an event within its context, but any
movement toward integration of the phenomena should stop when a context is
characterized in fairly general terms. Causes are seen in relationships to other events
occuring in the same historical space. This method W.H. Walsh and Isaiah Berlin call
“colligation." Relative integration only. (As Burckhardt, for example.)
'Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century
fizro/re (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. x.
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Duck Pond
Cecile Gray

The freshman scratches words
in his notebook: duck prints,
mudsplash, nothing said.
He searches the floor

as a duck scans the snow.
No hand to give him bread.
He flinches and starts,
but his pin-feather feelings

stick in his skin: no long thoughts
flow to the page. They ought
to come swift as skates!
His webs slip and claw.

He feels, but he doesn’t know.
Words like ducklings will march
in lines when the damn thaw comes.
He quacks for crumbs.
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Don Juan
Dreams of Diana
Cecile Gray
(she said) At the end of clear ground, you cut through
the canebrake, quivered as stags do, sensing me:
the huntress, the archer, the hound
that sniffed your heels. And 1 followed.
1 would not have thought I could drop my arrows
or open my bow-hardened hands.
My heart expects cliff and briar and quickens
to battle. Yet it breaks for you,
its crust gone chalk and thin
as the moon’s white barnacles.
1 cling. Will my weight make you stumble?
1 dream I could comfort you (here I wept)
with my old blood courage; but 1 press
your mortal’s touch to all my wounds.
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Exegesis and
Interpretation in
Biblical Studies
Paul L. Redditt
Biblical study, if one stops to consider the matter, attempts to
understand the thinking of ancient writers from a Middle Eastern
country. In that, biblical study is no different from philosophy or
classical studies. Biblical study, however, has one further task not
necessarily incumbent on students of other ancient countries. The
biblical scholar is asked to cross time, language and worldview, and
to rescue meaning from those ancient texts which aids, even directs,
our living today. Such a task is at least Herculean; some would say
impossible. This paper, then, is an explanation and demonstration of
biblical studies, especially gospel studies, as performed by the
majority of critical scholars. I hope to persuade you that such studies
are indeed scholarly and are attuned to historical and literary issues.
Scholarship being what it is, there are many specialties in biblical
studies. Personally, my research interests lie in post-exilic prophecy. I
suspect it would be more interesting to you if I select a text from the
New Testament gospels. Another reason for choosing to work with
the gospels is that the methods are best honed here. In the pages that
follow, then, 1 will attempt both to explain and demonstrate how a
biblical scholar investigates a text. 1 will focus my presentation
around the work of Rudolf Bultmann, not because he is the latest
word, but because his viewpoint represents the starting point for most
New Testament studies today.
The Issue of Method

Before we can approach a biblical text, a couple of matters of
method must be addressed. 1 shall be employing two methods in
particular, methods with their own presuppositions and rules too
numerous to mention and defend.
The first of these methods is called Form Criticism. It is the attempt
to reconstruct the original, oral form of a story or saying, complete
with its original setting in life and typical meaning. The second
method goes by various names, but generally is called the history of
traditions method. This method attempts to reconstruct the history
of a story or saying, so far as this history is recoverable, from its
original, oral stage to its final written stage(s).
A second methodological concern is the matter of written sources.
Considerable research suggests that behind the Gospels of Matthew,
38

Mark and Luke lie four written traditions. The first of these sources is
called Q, from the German word Quelle, well. Q is, by definition, the
sayings of Jesus common to Matthew and Luke, but missing from
Mark. Q is thought to have consisted entirely of sayings, with only
half-verse settings. The Gospel of Thomas, discovered at Nag
Hammdi in Egypt, is just such a gospel, but it is not Q.
The second source is the Gospel of Mark. Most scholars still hold
that either Mark, or an earlier version of our Gospel, provided the
basic narrative structure of the Synoptic Gospels. (The first three
Gospels are so named because they agree in many places in their
presentation of Jesus.) In addition to Q and Mark, there appear to
have been special traditions belonging to Matthew and Luke; for
example, the Birth stories and Luke’s parable of the Good Samaritan.
These four sources, then, comprise the written tradition lying behind
the Synoptics.
A third methodological note concerns determining the authenticity
of the sayings of Jesus, that is, whether one has grounds for saying
Jesus actually made the statements attributed to him in the Gospels.
The problem is that the Gospels are clearly the product of the church
and show evidence of their authors’ consciously using and shaping
sayings to fit their own, late first century polemical needs.
New Testament scholars generally use three criteria to determine
authenticity. The first is the criterion of dissimilarity. If a saying
attributed to Jesus displays no bias from the Gospel writers or
espouses no views known to have been polemical, and if the saying is
unlikely to have come from Judaism, then it may with some
confidence be attributed to Jesus. Put facetiously, if a saying
attributed to Jesus sounds neither Jewish nor Christian, it may be
assumed to be authentic. The second criterion is that of coherence.
Material may be accepted as authentic if it can be shown to cohere
with material already established by the negative criterion. Finally,
some scholars argue (weakly) that sayings found in all four gospels
are likely to be authentic. Use of these criteria, dissimilarity,
coherence, and multiple attestation, furnish sayings with a reasonable
claim to authenticity.
The first three questions have dealt with methods to explain or
exegete a text. The fourth, and last, issue deals with the matter of
interpretation. No unanimity exists among biblical scholars about
the correct method(s) of interpretation. What I shall do is focus on
the method developed by Rudolf Bultmann, the most influential
voice in New Testament study during this century.
Bultmann’s method of interpretation has two overriding principles.
The first he calls demythologizing. Simply put, Bultmann does not
accept the Bible’s worldview, with a three-storied universe, an
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apocalyptic end, and a mythical redeemer. He is not alone in that
rejection. Most liberal Protestants before him simply peeled off that
worldview, like the husks around a peanut, and seized what was left.
Bultmann argued, however, that such a practice is unsound, because
arbitrary, and that the biblical images must be interpreted —
remythologized if you please.
How shall one reinterpret the Bible? By what criterion shall one
remythologize? Here enters Bultmann’s second principle. Living
through the intellectual and social — not to mention ethical —
upheaval caused by World War 1 and the collapse of liberal
progressivism, Bultmann turned to the existentialist thought of his
day. What was crucial, however, was that he grounded his interpreta
tion in the New Testament itself. He saw the book as a demand for
decision: a decision for faith, integrity, God. When Jesus came
preaching that the kingdom of God was in the midst of his hearers, he
was neither proclaiming his kingship, nor predicting the end of the
world. He was announcing that the present must be seen/lived as the
end time, that every moment was pregnant with the potential for
authenticity. Thus Bultmann had his tools for exegeting and
interpreting the New Testament.
Exegesis: The Parable of the Sower

In order to make this essay more concrete, 1 have chosen a fairly
well known parable of Jesus, the Parable of the Sower. Its core is
widely held to be authentic. It has the advantage of appearing in all
three synoptics; so we can see how it developed. What is more, during
its transmission it became the vehicle for the early Church’s own
search for interpretation and understanding, with particular regard
to the parables of Jesus. The parable thus is apt for our consideration.
In studying this parable, I shall trace four steps. First, 1 will quote
Norman Perrin’s translation of the parable itself found in Mark 4:3-9.
Then 1 shall deal with the question of what it originally meant, again
following Perrin. Third, we shall see how the Gospel of Mark used it
to open up the question of why Jesus spoke in parables. Finally, we
shall see how Matthew and Luke, following Q, add another authentic
statement of Jesus, replacing a motif in Mark with their own agenda.
Norman Perrin translates the parable in Mark as follows:
Listen! A sower went out to sow. And as he sowed,
some seed fell along the path, and the birds came and
devoured it. Other seed fell on rocky ground, where it had
not much soil, and immediately it sprang up, since it had
no depth of soil, and when the sun rose it was scorched,
and since it had no root it withered away. Other seed fell
among the thorns and the thorns grew up and choked it.
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and it yielded no grain. And other seeds fell into good soil
and brought forth grain, growing up and increasing and
yielding thirtyfold and sixtyfold and a hundredfold. And
he said, “He who has an ear to hear, let him hear.”''
Bultmann cites the parable as one whose meaning is irretrievably
lost. He does speculate whether it is a “consolation for every man
when his labor does not all bear fruit,” or “a monologue by Jesus, half
of resignation, half of thankfulness,” or “an exhortation to the
bearers of the divine Word,” or “of Jesus’ preaching,” or simply a
statement that not all who hear would be saved.* Perrin, by contrast
thinks the parable is easier to understand. He says:
When we recognize the original point as that of the
contrast between the handful of seed and the bushels of
harvest, and when we set the parable finally in the context
of the proclamation of God acting as king in experience of
men confronted by the message and ministry of Jesus,...
the significance of (the) story ... is surely that of a
contrast between present and future: in the present
forgiveness but also temptation; here and now table
fellowship in the name of the Kingdom of God, but only
in anticipation of its richest blessings. Seed time and
harvest are well established Jewish metaphors for the
work of God in the world and its consummation... Jesus
. . . looked forward to a consummation to which this
(present time) was related as seed-time to harvest.^
Bultmann’s attempts to understand focused on the contrast of the
soils, Perrin’s , on the contrast of seed versus harvest. It is not
necessary for us to decide which — if either — is correct. A parable is
susceptible to more than one meaning. These suggestions
give us some very good clues as to the original meaning of this
agricultural parable. Let us turn now to see what happened to it.
We may be sure that the disciples of Jesus for some reason or other
remembered the parable and used it in their preaching. If its meaning
to Bultmann was obscure, he may not have been alone. The disciples
too may have found it ambiguous, or else appropriate
for apologetics, and gave it a particular meaning. The interpretation
of the parable found in Mark 4:13-20 allegorizes it. The sower is still
not specified, but one might guess it is the preaching community. The
seeds that fall along the path are beset by Satan before the seed (the
potential converts) can germinate. The seeds that fall on rocky soil
are the sympathetic listeners who believe at first, but when persecution
comes, they recant. The seeds among the thorns are poeple who
cannot renounce the world and its pleasures, while those seeds that
fell in the good soil are the true believers. Gone are the emphases
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upon different soils and the contrast between seed-time and harvest.
In their place is the experience of the Christian community in its
quasi-successful efforts to evangelize.
We perhaps owe to the Markan tradition Mark 4:10-12, written
along with 4:1-2, the setting of the parable. The chapter opens with a
public proclamation, but the explanation is private. Mark 4:10-12
functions not only to narrow the audience to the disciples, but also to
show that the believers have the key to unlock the secrets to Jesus’
mysteries. Indeed the reason Jesus taught in parables is now said to
have been to code the gospel, so that the outsiders would hear but not
understand.
This last function betrays a littleness of spirit on the part of a
ridiculed, even persecuted, community, the teachings of whose
Master had been scorned. Certainly the parables of Jesus were public
and clear, but the approved interpretation of the community
was allowed only to the select inner group.
At this point we confront what Werner Kelber has called the point
of tension between the oral and the written form of language. In an
oral performance the audience and the speaker interact, and each
telling of a story or parable is new and fresh. A gesture toward a field
or an inflection in the voice gives a new meaning to an old recitation.
When, however, the parable is reduced to writing, it takes a fixed
form. Its context is the context provided by the writer, who thereafter
loses all control over the meaning.Hence, the written gospel
attempts to provide the correct meaning, or at least a correct meaning
(in contrast with mistaken meanings).
Still the Synoptic tradition kept building. The reference to seeing
but not perceiving is actually an allusion to an Old Testament text,
Isaiah 6:9-10. That verse had to do with Isaiah’s ministry. He was
commissioned to a futile task, to preach to a people who would not
listen. Mark 4:12 applies that Old Testament text to the early church’s
context to claim that Jesus taught in parables to prevent non
believers from understanding. The Gospel of Matthew carries that
understanding a step further. Recognizing the allusion to Isaiah
6:9-10, Matthew quotes the passage. Characteristic of Matthew’s
Gospel is the insistence that things happened in the life of Jesus to
fulfill Old Testament prophecy. This allusion from Mark 4 is thus
turned into another fulfillment passage in the New Testament.
Yet one more development is discernible in the growth of this
tradition. If you will notice, Mark 4:13 criticizes the disciples for not
understanding. Obviously this critique originally provided the
opportunity for Jesus (i.e. the early church) to “explain” the parable.
As we have seen, however, Mark 4:10-12 and the parallel messages
Matthew 13:10-15, Luke 8:9-10, have argued that the disciples
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(i.e., the not-so-early church) as opposed to non-believers do
understand. Thus Matthew and Luke omit the critique of the
disciples found in Mark 4:13: “Do you not understand this parable?
How then will you understand all the parables?” In place of this
negative query, both Matthew and Luke supply another authentic
statement of Jesus, probably taken from Q. The saying in Matthew
13:16-17 and Luke 10:23-24 has lost its original context, though its
purpose is clearly to compliment an audience for seeing something
Jesus has been explaining. The saying takes on a limited reference,
namely the disciples, from its present context in Matthew and Luke
so that now it is the disciples who see and hear. This “correcting” of
the portrait of Mark 4:13 Bultmann calls the “Christianizing” of the
portrait of the disciples.*
To recapitulate, we have seen a parable about sowing seeds at
different stages in its history. At first it was a folk parable drawing on
the life of the peasants to whom it was delivered, and was taken up in
the preaching of the church because of its usefulness. Once reduced to
writing, however, it became a polemical vehicle to show that those in
the communities behind Mark and the other Synoptics had genuine
insight in the teachings of Jesus not available to others, perhaps some
Christians, certainly not to unbelievers. Finally we saw the work of
Luke and Matthew, especially in toning down the criticism of the
disciples, incorporating another saying from Q and making explicit
biblical allusions. We have done what we can to uncover what it
meant at various levels of the tradition; we now turn to see what it
means today.
Interpretation: The Parable of the Sower

You may have already begun to wonder why, if Perrin can tell us
what Jesus originally meant by the Parable of the Sower, anyone
would want to search further for the meaning of the story. Indeed,
critical scholars of an earlier era thought that their goal was to strip
away all the later accretions and interpretations of the church and the
gospel writers and lay bare the teachings of Jesus. Such a view is
simplistic for several reasons. (1) It is by no means certain that Perrin
has uncovered the original meaning. (2) Indeed, as I pointed out
before, it is not even certain that a parable would have only one
meaning; each oral recitation would give it different nuances, and
parabolic language is by nature polyvalent. (3) Most importantly, the
parable was not addressed to us. It was, as 1 mentioned, addressed to
Palestinian peasants and delivered in Aramaic. If the parable speaks
to contemporary Christians, it does so, not directly, but because it
illuminates in its specificity the general human predicament. It
captures a general truth that can partially transcend the times and
43

cultures that produced it. If it can do that, it is a remarkable piece of
literature.
.
The process of interpretation for such an ancient text must tne
bridge a time/language/worldview/cultural gap that is immense^
Generally speaking such an effort may be represented y a simp
algebraic-type ratio. We may say:
The word of Jesus
=
^
His time
^
The task of the interpreter is to solve for X, the interpreted word ot
am not aware that Bultmann ever actually interpreted Mark
4-3-9 Nevertheless, this fool will rush in where that angel feared to
tread. 1 shall attempt to tell you what Bultmann would have said
about the meaning of Mark 4:3-9, provided that he had agreed with
Perrin that the parable deals with the contrast between now and the
^""Smann has argued that Jesus was no apocalypticist; that is, he
did not look forward to an imminent end-of-the-world cataclysm and
a Future Age. Instead, Bultmann contends Jesus announced the
inbreak of the End-time within history. Jesus’ message was a call to
live as if the end were now, to live each moment fully and
Perrin aruged that the Parable of the Sower pointed to a
consummation to which the present was related as sowing time to
harvest time Bultmann would question only the term “consummation.
He would argue that the parable contrasts the present which is with
the future that is possible, if one decides for authenticity, that is, for
the life of faith. The present is, as Perrin contended, beset with
temptation; but for one who has eyes to see and the faith to comniit,
the eschaton lies just ahead and within history. The Parable of the
Sower then might be interpreted as an exhortation, encouraging the
believer to excel in faith and not lose hope.
Conclusion

Biblical scholarship attempts by various means to understand and
apply the insights of ancient texts to modern life. 1 have perhaps
suggested to you more unanimity than actually exists, but for critical
scholars - as distinct from more traditional scholars — the questions
and methods are the same, even if the answers are sometimes
different.
One may ask, however, about the understanding of Scripture as
revelation if it is to be interpreted by canons not unlike those used in
other disciplines. That is, conservative folks sometimes object that
liberals treat the Bible like any other book. To that charge modern
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scholars, if they bother at all, respond in two ways: (1) whatever else
the Bible may be, it is first literature, and (2) intellectually, here 1
stand, I can do no other.
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Wanting,
Desiring,
and Valuing
Mitchell Staude
The word “desire" may be said to be a concertina-word:
it moves between narrower and wider senses. But the
widest sense, which 1 have employed, is a perfectly
legitimate sense. There is a perfectly good sense in
which everything we do, meaning to do it, is what we
want to do, and in which all desires to act which we do not
act from are also things we want to do.
D.M. Armstrong’
The natural position to be opposed is this: since all motivated action must result
from the operation of some motivating factor within the agent, and since belief
cannot by itself produce action, it follows that a desire of the agent must always be
operative if the action is to be genuinely his.
Thomas Nagel’
There are conflicting interpretations ... of what it is to want to do something. In a
relatively strong sense a man wants to do something if he looks forward to it with
pleasure or expects to enjoy doing it; it is in this sense that a man does not want to
do as he ought. In a weaker sense a man wants to perform some action simply in so
far as he thinks that, for whatever reason, it is the thing to do; it is in this sense that
a man does want to do as he ought, just because he thinks he ought to do it,
Don Locke’

Introduction
Before the rise of psychology as a discipline separate from
philosophy, the question of the nature of human nature was part of
the realm of metaphysics. Theories of human nature attempted to
analyze human experiences and activities as due to certain capacities
and powers that make an individual a human.2 These various powers
and capacities were classified under two headings: the conative were
those by which a person is moved to act, the cognitive were those by
which one knows and understands. Cognitive powers and capacities
were usually grouped together and referred to as Reason; conative
powers and capacities, however, went by many names: passions,
desires, impulses, appetites, instinct, volitions, will. Sometimes there
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was mention of a third category of capacities, the affective — those by
which one is affected by external stimuli. Usually, however, these
capacities were also seen to be either cognitive (e.g., perception) or
conative (e.g., passion). Much of the history of psychology up to the
nineteenth century involves discussions and disagreements concerning
how the cognitive and conative are usually related and whether this
relationship could be altered.
Historically, the debate over the proper relationship between the
cognitive and the conative was more than an exercise in metaphysical
theorizing. Discussions of how the cognitive and the conative are
actually, or usually, related often led to discussions of whether this
relationship was the one most conducive to human happiness. The
proper (sometimes seen as distinct from the actual) relationship
between the two was seen as providing a metaphysical foundation for
ethical and political theory. There were two major positions on the
proper relation between the cognitive and the conative: rationalism
and voluntarism.3
“Rationalism,” in one of its senses, applies to those theories of
human nature maintaining that reason is capable of motivating a
person to act — in other words, that some cognitive states have
conative powers. Plato is considered the paradigm rationalist. His
characterizations of the “types of souls" ranging from the tyrant to
the philosopher provide illustrations of the different ways in which
reason can be related to the passions, appetites, and desires.^ For
Plato, unhappiness, immorality, and civil injustice are the results of
an improper relationship between reason (cognitive) and the nonrational conative aspects of human nature. Kant’s distinction between
motivation by duty and motivation by inclination can also be cited as
an instance of rationalism.® For Kant, genuine moral behavior is only
possible when one is motivated by reason, rather than by some
non-cognitive influence.
While rationalistic theories of human nature attribute conative
powers to cognitive states, voluntaristic theories keep the cognitive
separate from the conative. Psychological voluntarism is the general
theory of human motivation that all humans are motivated to pursue
the ends they do pursue by non-rational, non-cognitive influences
and that if reason has any contributory role at all, it is simply to
determine which are the best means to go about pursuing those ends.
Thomas Hobbes and David Hume have probably been the most
influential proponents of this view.® For Hobbes, all human action
and feeling stem from Desire and Aversion, and the appreciation of
this is essential for the foundation of morality and the establishment
and preservation of civil society. Hume sees all human action,
including moral action, springing from what he calls the Passions,
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and he presents the clearest articulation of the voluntaristic posi
on the relation between the cognitive and the conative.
eason ,
and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretena
to any other office than to serve and obey them.”^
One consequence of psychological voluntarism, since reason has
no function in determining ends, is that no desire or passion and no goal
pursued are rational or irrational. Certain goals may well be
imprudent, that is, the achieving of that goal would involve or result
in the frustration of many other desires, but wanting that goal is in
itself not irrational. This consequence of psychological voluntarism
leads to axiological voluntarism. Since no end pursued is either
rational or irrational, and since ends, goals, are simply the objects of
desire or passion, it follows that the value an end has is not something
recognized, discovered, or determined by reason but is merely a
function of whether it satisfies some motivating influence. And if the
value an end has is solely determined by its being an object of a
motivating influence, the question of whether the end is good or bad
in itself, that is, independently of it being desired or willed, is
meaningless.® Hobbes and Spinoza are the classic proponents of
axiological voluntarism and Spinoza offers the clearest statement of
this position: “We neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything
because we think it to be good, but on the contrary, we adjudge a
thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it. ®
Today, the importance of psychological voluntarism is immense.
I n psychology and psychiatry its influence is almost omnipresent. It is
that core of existentialism that lead critics of this view of man to
brand it “irrationalism.” It is an essential ingredient of much of
Protestant theology since Kierkegaard and is making inroads into
Catholic theology as well. It has also become involved in the
controversy concerning whether one ought to believe something on
faith, as is evident from the title of the discussion of this issue by
William James: “The Will to Believe.”’®
In the writings of Anglo-American analytic philosophers, psycho
logical voluntarism is quite prevalent, although the notions of
impulse, instinct, volition, and will are practically anathema. Passions,
appetites, and aversions, along with those phenomena that nonanalytic philosophers call volitions, are usually either analyzed in
terms of desires or simply reclassified as such — as one philosopher
puts it: “In old-fashioned language, the Will is not a separate faculty
from Desire.”” In addition to reducing most conative factors to
desire, the voluntarism found in analytic philosophy uses “desire”
and “want” interchangeably; illustrating this usage is D. M. Armstrong’s
statement of voluntarism, perhaps the clearest statement of it in
analytical philosophy:
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The word “desire” may be said to be a concertina-word: it
moves between narrower and wider senses. But the widest
sense, which 1 have employed, is a perfectly legitimate
sense. There is a perfectly good sense in which everything
we do, meaning to do it, is what we want to do, and in
which all desires to act which we do not act from are also
things we want to do.^*
There are, then, two features of the voluntarism dominant in
contemporary analytical philosophy: (1) the conative is reduced to
desire — desire is the source of all motivation and feeling — and
(2) “desire” is used in the widest sense and is interchangeable with
“want.”
In view of this new form of voluntarism, the relationship between
desires (or wants) and behavior is the core of all philosophical issues
connected with human action. Some attempts at resolving, some at
dissolving, the “freewill” problem maintain that free action is not
incompatible with caused behavior, but rather is to be contrasted
instead with coerced action. On this view, free actions are those
actions resulting from the agent’s desires, not from either the wants of
others or from external forces acting on the agent’s body; free action
is action motivated by desire. In the fields of value theory and ethics,
hedonism, ethical egoism, and some forms of utilitarianism are often
founded on the voluntaristic theory of psychological egoism: the
theory that all human actions are motivated not simply by desire but
by a certain kind of desire. In theories of responsibility and in
philosophy of action, the distinction between intentional actions and
unintentional actions is explained in terms of the agent’s wants,
which leads to analyses of intentional action in terms of actions
generated by wants: intentional action is action motivated by desire.
(When intentional action is viewed in this way, the analysis of free
action as action motivated by desire will have to be modified: for not
all intentional acts are free acts.)
For the form of voluntarism prevalent in analytic philosophy, the
issue of the relation between the cognitive and the conative becomes
the issue of the relation between reason and desire. At the center of
the question of what role reason plays, or should play, in directing
human behavior are the concepts of rational action and of acting for a
reason. Two different theories of the relation between reason and
desire have gained ascendency: these can be called the Humean and
the Davidsonian.’3 On the Humean view, reasons are beliefs of a
certain sort (either value beliefs or beliefs about means to something
else), which are incapable of motivating by themselves. No matter
how many reasons a person may have for doing something. A, unless
he also wants to do A, he will not do it: desires must be added to
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reasons for there to be motivation. The Davidsonian position agrees
with the Humean that beliefs are incapable of motivating by
themselves and that desires are necessary for motivation, but it denies
that reasons are incapable of motivating. Reasons can be motivating
on the Davidsonian account, for what it is to have a reason for doing
something. A, is (1) to believe that doing A will have a certain
property or be a certain kind of action and (2) to want’** to do actions
that have this property or are of this kind. Reasons can be motivating
without additional desire because having a reason is already to have a
desire. For both positions, rational action is action motivated by
desire.
Consider the following schema for a voluntaristic view of human
nature. There are certain basic or foundational desires that we as
humans share (our human nature). A foundational desire has as its
object the actualization (exemplification) of a certain property 0 by
the desirer, e.g. pleasure, reduction of tension, avoidance of pain.’®
When a person has (or acquires) a belief that objects or activities of
type F have property
a desire for A’s is generated (and remains
dispositional) a part of that person as long as the belief and the
foundational desire do). The person now has a “general” desire for
A’s. If the person acquires a belief of a particular object a: that it
exemplifies A, a desire for object x is generated. It is by a process with
this structure that desires for particular objects — or “particular”
desires — come into being. But most desires that we have are not
immediately satisfiable; we need to strive to satisfy them. Hence,
beliefs as to how to satisfy them are needed. When the agent realized
that only by doing an act of type A will the desire be satisfied, a want
to do an act of type A is generated.’® But even this may not be enough,
for an act of type A may not be something the agent can do without
doing something else first. And so a belief concerning how (the
means) to do A is required. This “want-generated-by-belief’ process
continues until the person reaches a belief that by doing A now he can
start pursuing his goal. This belief generates the want to do N now,
which in turn — unless something interferes — motivates (causes) the
person to do N.
This is a very powerful conception of the structure of motivation. It
gives some account of how beliefs and desires interact in the
production of action and of how general desires can issue in specific
acts. It provides a basis for an account of rational action — an
account that can distinguish between the rationality of a person’s
behavior given that person’s belief-desire system and the rationality
of that belief-desire system itself. It can distinguish between free and
unfree actions by claiming that whenever an agent’s beliefs as to how
to satisfy a basic desire are generated by someone else using force.
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coercion, or various forms of psychological manipulation, the agent
“unfreely” comes to want to do that which he (she) would not have
wanted to do if such interference had not occurred and that actions
that are the causal result of this unfree want are themselves unfree.
Intentional action on this account would be acts of a person that are
immediately caused by a want to do those acts.’^ Some of the
problems of deviant causal chains that plague many theories of action
are avoided, for there is very little room for deviance from wanting to
do A at time t,, to doing A at tj. This conception of action seems
also to get some support from the widest sense of wanting, by
providing an explanation for why there should be such a sense:
every intentional action can be said to be wanted because each
act that is intentional is caused by a want to do that act.’®
I will call theories of motivation having this structure stringent
voluntarism.’® Stringent voluntarism consists of four theses: (1) desire
(or some other kind of non-cognitive state) is the source of all
motivation; (2) non-fundamental desires are generated by beliefs
interacting with more general desires; (3) action results when wants
to do particular acts at particular times are generated; and (4) the
relation between these specific wants and the acts they produce is that
of cause to effect.
It is my view that given a straightforward interpretation of the four
theses of strict voluntarism, and treating (3) and (4) as one thesis, all
are false. But it is difficult to establish the falsity of a philosophical
view and 1 am not sure that strict voluntarism can be proven false.
What 1 shall try to do instead is articulate an alternative view that
(1) denies the major theses of strict voluntarism; (2) can account for
the same phenomena, with plausibility comparable to the denied
theses; and (3) point out some phenomena that strict voluntarism
does not handle as well.
If there is a distinction between wider and narrower senses of
“desire,” then it would seem that the nature of the relationships
between desire and reason and between desire and action will depend
upon what sense of “desire” is being used. With rare exception,®®
analytical philosophers use the widest sense in their discussions of
these crucial relationships.®’ This widest sense is that sense in which a
person can be said to have wanted to do anything he intentionally did
— for if he hadn’t wanted to do it, he would not have done it. First, I
shall show that this widest sense of “desire” or “want”®® does not
contribute any plausibility to strict voluntarism and to the extent that
it is thought that it does, how it operates in explanations of actions
has been misunderstood. Second, 1 shall argue that when the widest
sense is used, we cannot understand what an agent is claiming when
he claims either to have not wanted to do what he intentionally did do
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or to have wanted to do something else more than he wanted to do
what he actually did do. Third, 1 shall maintain that attempts to
defend strict voluntarism by making distinctions between intrinsic
wantings and extrinsic warnings and between really wanting and
wanting all things considered will not work. I shall do this latter by
arguing that the way we experience and the way we talk about
motivational conflicts are not adequately captured by these dis
tinctions. 1 shall conclude by claiming that many cases of motivational
conflict are best accounted for by a view of motivational incompatible
with strict (or even moderate) voluntarism.
II.
The Widest Sense of “Wanting”

The widest sense of “wanting” is such that for any act that an agent
intentionally performs, (1) there are contexts in which he can be said
to have wanted to do that act, and (2) a want-explanation can be
given. If the plausibility of strict voluntarism is to be undercut, we
need an account of why it is every intentional action can be said to be
wanted and what is the relation between that want and that action, an
account that does not view this relation as that of cause to effect.
Consider the following explanatory stories.
A. John wanted to make Mary happy. Because he
wanted to make her happy, he gave her some flowers.
Because he wanted to give her some flowers this evening,
he bought some flowers. Because he wanted to buy some
flowers, he went to the florist. Because he wanted to go to
the florist before it closed, he left work early. Because he
wanted to leave work early, he went to work early.
Because he wanted to go to work early, he got up at 6:00
a.m.
B. Bill, who was tired and sleepy, wanted a cup of
coffee. He wanted a cup of coffee because he wanted to be
alert for class this afternoon. He wanted to be alert for
class this afternoon because he wanted to do well on the
exam next week. He wanted to do well on the exam next
week because he wanted to get a good grade in the course.
He wanted to get a good grade because he wanted to keep
his grade average high.
In both stories, there is a chain of relative ends, each end is cited to
explain something done, or wanted, as a means to it and is in turn
explained by citing some further end. And although the first link in
each chain is not viewed as being, or involving, a relative end, one can
imagine other actions for which it would be: e.g., John’s going to bed
early the night before. Bill’s wanting change for a dollar. Nor is the
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last cited end necessarily a final end: John could have wanted to make
Mary happy so he could invite some friends over to watch the game;
Bill could have wanted to keep his grade average high because he
wanted to qualify for a fellowship. With chains of relative ends like A,
(1) every action, except the first, is not only explained by a want but is
also said to be wanted and (2) what explains the agent’s action also
explains his wanting to do that action. This generates chains of
motivational explanations such as B, which involves explanations
not of an agent’s actions, but his wants.
In these chains of motivational explanations an agent’s behavior is
explained by showing how he was motivated to do it as a means to
something else. An action is explained either by citing something else
the agent was motivated to pursue or by claiming that he was
motivated to perform that act as an end-in-itself. Such explanations
do not reveal what it is that is motivating the agent to pursue the goal
he is motivated to pursue. If there is a sense of “wanting” that is used
to refer to factors that motivate, that initiate a purposive pursuit of a
goal, this might be called “ ‘wanting’ in the motivating sense”; as it
stands, the sense of “want” used in the motivational explanations
thus far is only a “motivated sense,” that is, to say that an agent
wanted to do something, in the widest sense, is to say that he was
motivated to do it.
Stories A and B, when examined closely, also reveal a very
important feature of motivational explanations and of the widest, the
motivated, sense of “wanting.” It is obvious that “________________
is a means to . . .” is a transitive relation. This transitivity is
embedded in motivational explanations: if John does x in order to do
y and does y in order to do z, then John does x in order to do z.”
Stories A and B also reveal this transitivity in motivational explana
tions: in both, it is the agent’s being motivated to pursue some end
(e.g., making Mary happy, keeping one’s grade average high) that
explains the agent being motivated to pursue or do those things that
are means to that end. Motivational influence is transitive; it is
transferred across the relation from end to means. Following Nagel,
I call this characteristic the transitivity of motivational influence.
It is the transitivity of motivational influence that underlies the
various links in purposive explanatory chains. But this characteristic
does not explicitly reveal the immediate cause of an intentional act.
“John gave Mary flowers because he wanted to make her happy”
explains John’s behavior, in light of the transitivity of motivational
influence, in the following way: John was motivated to make Mary
happy (by what he was motivated is not given) and because of this he
was motivated to give her flowers and did. Not only does this
explanation not cite what was motivating John to make Mary happy,
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it does not cite the immediate motivating influence behind his action
such that he was motivated to give her flowers rather than, for
example, take her to dinner.
Although there is no explicit mention of the immediate motivating
factor of John’s behavior, that factor is implicit in our understanding
of the want-explanation. The implicit factor in all purposive explana
tion is belief. If John gave Mary flowers because he wanted to make
her happy, then John believed that giving her flowers would make her
happy, or would be a means to it. And he would not have given her
the flowers if he had not had this belief. 1 n some sense of “implies,” then.
Agent S does act A because he wants to do Y
implies
Agent S believes that doing A is a means to Y.
The beliefs an agent has about the means to his ends are a crucial
element in motivation. In fact, one can give a motivational explana
tion of a person’s behavior solely in terms of his beliefs; for example,
John gave Mary flowers because he believed it would make her
happy. In some sense of the word “implies”
Agent S does A because he believes doing A is a means to Y
implies
Agent S wants to do Y
The transitivity of motivational influence is such that motivational
influence is transferred across the relation from end to means — but
transferred to what? When we are motivated to pursue or bring about
some end, beliefs (whether newly acquired or already held) coneerning
more immediate ends that would lead to or facilitate the bringing
about of the final goal acquire, have transferred to them, the
motivational influence to direct our behavior towards these more
immediate ends. Such a belief is able to motivate a person only when
it occurs within the context of the person already being motivated to
pursue the end.
That sense of “wanting” that applies to all intentional actions, the
widest sense, refers not to a spring of action, to something that moves
a person to act, but rather to a state in which an agent is being moved
to act. Wants, therefore, are not what moves one to act intentionally,
but are states of a person being moved to behave: as Don Locke puts
it, wanting “is the causing, not the cause.
If the above account is plausible, then it provides a challenge to two
of the central theses of strict voluntarism; the thesis concerning the
generation of desire and the thesis concerning the causal role of
generated desire. But these theses are not necessary for a voluntaristic
theory of motivation; strict voluntarism can be modified. Instead of
having “generated desires” separate from the beliefs, a modest
voluntarism can allow that all such desires are states in which the
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agent is being influenced by the relevant beliefs. But these cognitive
states have only the power of modifying motivational direction, not
of initiating. Foundational desires are the source, and the only source
of this motivational influence.*®
III.
Voluntarism and Doing What One Doesn’t Want to Do

Voluntarism (strict and modest) not only uses the widest sense of
“wanting” to support its claims about the generation of actions, it
also uses it to reject the claim of rationalism that there are some things
we are motivated to do but we are not motivated by desire: “but you
would not have done it if you had not wanted to do it” is the usual
response. Using the widest sense of “wanting,” this response is true
—but all it says is that if you had not been motivated to do what you
did you would not have done it. This latter claim is not very
informative and certainly cannot be used as a refutation of rationalism.
There are additional problems with using just the widest sense of
“wanting” in one’s motivational views. For one, what is being claimed
when someone says that he didn’t want to do what he intentionally
did do? Consider the following case.
Case One: The Reluctant Exerciser
Fred wants to be healthy. He also wants to become
healthy. He realizes that the only way to become healthy
is to do three things: (1) change his eating habits, (2) quit
smoking, and (3) exercise. Although he hates exercising,
doesn’t want to quit smoking, and loves to eat, he will do
all three things necessary to become healthy.
When Fred claims that he doesn’t want to quit smoking or that he
doesn’t want to go jogging at 6:30 a.m. each morning, he cannot be
using the widest sense of “wanting” — because he does do these things
and hence wants (is motivated) to do them. Hence, he must be using
some narrower sense of “wanting.” But voluntarism can account for
cases like this by distinguishing two narrower senses of wanting. A
person can either want or pursue something as an end-in-itself or
want something as only a means to achieving something else wanted:
the widest sense of “wanting” covers both intrinsic wanting and
extrinsic wanting. Often when a person denies of what he did
intentionally that it was something he wanted to do, he is denying that
he intrinsically wanted to do it.
There are other kinds of cases in which an agent claims to have not
wanted to do what he intentionally did do. And some of these cases
do not present any problems for voluntarism. Consider the following
case.
Case Two: The Disappointed Applicant
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Robert wants to become a good philosopher and make
some contribution to his field. He believes that the best
way to achieve his goal is by being part of a philosophy
faculty at a college or university. He wants very much to
go to the University of Texas at Austin because he
believes he would learn much through working with
several members of that philosophy department, whose
work he finds stimulating. But he accepts a job at a local
community college, for it was the only one offered.
Robert does not want to be at this community college, but
this is what he will do.
Since what Robert is said to want (to teach at Austin) and what he
does but claims not to want are both means to an end, the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic wanting is inapplicable to this
contrast. Usually, the distinction between rea//>' wanting dind wanting
all things considered is introduced to explicate this kind of contrast.
The notion of wanting all things considered is the motivated sense
applied to actions: at the time of acting one always performs that act
one is most effectively motivated to do. This distinction indicates that
some factor in the agent’s situation, as he sees it, has interfered with
the effectiveness of one of his wants. The interfering factor in this case
is Robert’s (correct) belief that he did not have (since he was not
given) the opportunity to teach at Austin. Both the “all things
considered” qualification and the contrast with “really” wanting
serves to point out that (1) until something interfered, one had been
more strongly motivated to do something other than what one did,
and (2) if that interfering factor had not appeared, the agent would
not have acted as he did but would have done what he is said to have
really wanted to do.
Neither type of case — the reluctant exerciser and the disappointed
applicant — shows that voluntarism has difficulty in making sense of
not wanting to do what one does. Although strict voluntarism has
had to be modified, nothing said so far has challenged the basic
voluntaristic program. That is about to change.
IV.
Aversions: The Sexual Context as “Illustrative” of Desire

Case Three: The Rape
On the night of 21 August 1974, Anne Tonglet and
Araceli Castellano were camping in a pine forest on the
Mediterranean shore near Marseilles. About 1:00 a.m.,
they were awakened when three men entered their tent,
brandishing stones, and began to beat them. After being
beaten and threatened with death, the women agreed to
engage in sexual activities with these men. What followed
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was described, on the one hand, by the women, as a
“five-hour nightmare,” while on the other hand, by the
men, as “five-hours of joyous group sex . . . since in the
end the girls agreed. “The women, fearing death, intention
ally engaged in various activities and pretended to be very
friendly as the men left, afraid that they would not leave
or that they would kill them before leaving. The intentional
behavior of the women throughout that morning was
later used by the men’s lawyer as refuting the women’s
charge of rape; “a non-consenting woman cannot be
forced to practice certain caresses.
The Tonglet-Castellano case can be used not only to illustrate a
case in which it makes sense to deny that one did not want to do what
one did do but also how the widest sense of “wanting” can be used to
make very misleading statements. In the widest sense of “wanting,”
they wanted to do what they did, for they intentionally did it; and yet
the position taken by the men’s attorney that the women wanted to
have sex with them because they actively participated is surely
mistaken. Nor is the distinction between wanting all things considered
and really wanting helpful. What the women would be said to really
want to do is go back to sleep unmolested; but they were much more
strongly motivated to do what they didn’t want to do than they were
to simply go back to sleep unmolested.
Even though the women intentionally engaged in sexual activity,
rather than continuing to struggle or even simply remaining passive
(for both would have been seen by the men as resistance), they were
forced to do so, they had no choice.*® They were not simply forced to
act, they were forced to want to act. By denying that they wanted to
do what they did, by charging the men with rape, the women are
pointing out that their being motivated to do what they did was
forced upon them by the threat of death.
One way in which the notion of intrinsic wanting might be applied
to this case is to point out that Tonglet and Castellano wanted to
avoid being further harmed and did what they did in order to avoid
that; thus the end they were pursuing, the object of their desire, is said
to be “the avoidance of further harm.” But explaining someone’s
behavior by saying that the purpose of it was “the avoidance of Y”
places that behavior into an avoidance, not a pursuit, pattern; it does
not identify as a goal of pursuit behavior something called “the
avoidance of Y.”“Avoidances,” whatever they are, are not something
a person pursues; states-of-affairs, actions, and activities, on the
other hand, are the kinds of things a person will sometimes pursue
and sometimes avoid.*®
The transitivity of motivational influence may, and often does.
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generate avoidance motivation. If John wants to invite his friends to
his house to watch the game on T.V. and believes that if he does
anything to irritate Mary, he won’t be able to have his friends over, he
will be motivated to avoid doing anything he believes might irritate
Mary. But the avoidance motivation in the rape case is not generated
by pursuit motivation. What Tonglet and Castellano were motivated
to avoid was not something they believed to be incompatible with
achieving some goal they were motivated to pursue. Painful things,
harmful things, and deadly things are not things a person avoids
because they are believed to be a hindrance to the achieving of some
goal; they are things that are avoided simply because of what they are:
they are avoided as “ends in themselves.”
There is a class of actions and of wants that are explained not in
terms of some end one is motivated to pursue — some end one is
attracted to, as it were — but in terms of an “end” one is motivated to
avoid — an end one is repelled by. There are purposive patterns of
behavior that have as their goal the avoidance of such a repellent end
(which, for lack of a better word, will hereafter be called “repellents”
rather than “ends”). The rape case illustrates that there is one class of
repellents that are in some way associated with pain and are avoided
because they are so associated. In order to keep this form of
motivation distinct from both pursuit motivation and any other
forms of avoidance motivation there may be, motivational states of
avoiding repellents associated with pain can be called Aversions.
The force of the rape case lies in its implicit reliance on the moral
difference between engaging in sexual activities because one is
threatened with violence if one doesn’t and engaging in sexual
activities because one wants to. This difference, one might argue,
does hint at a narrower sense of “wanting,” for surely when one is said
to be engaging in sexual activities because one wants to, something
more is being said than simply one is motivated to do so — and that
something more is that one desires to. But all “because one wants to”
excludes when it is contrasted with “because one was forced to” or
“because one was threatened” is precisely that one wasn’t forced to or
threatened. That Janet’s having sex with Bill was not an instance of
rape but was done because she wanted to gives no clues to Janet’s
motivation for doing it except it wasn’t done out of fear: all that it
indicates is that the goal she is pursuing by acting is not one forced
upon her by the will of another. One does not know whether she is
acting out of desire, out of curiosity, out of pity, out of gratitude,
seeking revenge against her husband, or paying an old debt. Thus
using the notion of engaging in sexual activity because one wants to,
and not because one is being forced to, does not utilize the narrower
sense of “wanting” that applies only to ends.
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But this notion of engaging in sexual activity because one wants to
does lead to a narrower sense of “wanting,” once it is realized that the
question “as opposed to what?” can have different answers. Instead of
contrasting doing something because one wants to with doing
something because one is forced to, one can contrast it with other
kinds of motivational influences. If Bill is curious as to why Janet has
consented to having sex with him, she may try to reassure him that
she is doing it not because she is curious about what it’s like to do it
with someone other than her husband, nor because she feels sorry for
him, nor because she’s angry with her husband, but because she really
wants to do it. The same notion of wanting is working when Janet
tells her friend that she doesn’t really want to have sex with her
husband anymore, but that she does so anyway because she thinks it’s
her duty, or she doesn’t want to hurt him, or she doesn’t want him to
walk out. It is to cases of genuine motivational conflict that our
attention now turns.
V.
On Not Wanting to do What One Intrinsically Wants to Do:
The Case of Pleasure Motivation

Case Four: The Depressed Friend
William has been looking forward all week long to
attending a Sherlock Holmes film festival on Saturday,
which will feature two films with Arthur Wontner that are
rarely shown and that he has never seen. So that spending
all day at this festival would not conflict with his job
responsibilities, for the past week everything else has been
sacrificed in order to get all of his work done by Friday.
On Saturday morning, as he is getting ready to leave for
the festival, he receives a phone call from a close friend.
This friend suffers from occasional fits of depression
during which she loses touch with reality and becomes a
danger to herself; she is in one of those now and asks if he
would keep her company during the day. Having done it
before, William knows what it will be like if he goes — a
protracted, tedious, and exasperating attempt to convince
her of her own worth and to dissuade her from suicide, an
experience that will leave him so psychologically exhausted
that he will have great difficulty concentrating for days.
He has a choice as to how he’ll spend his day, a choice he
doesn’t like to make, a choice he wishes he didn’t have to
make. Realizing, however, that at the present time he is
probably the only one to whom she can turn, he agrees to
come over. But although William chooses to spend the
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day with his friend, he doesn’t want to. He doesn’t want to
do his duty; he wants to attend the Sherlock Holmes
When William claims that he didn’t want to do what he did do he
cannot, of course, be using the widest sense; but neither
narrower sense connected with intrinsic wanting. For in denying that
he wanted to spend the afternoon with his friend, that he wanted to do
his duty, he is not simply saying that he was motivated to do so as a
means rather than as an end-in-itself; there was nothing further that
he wanted to accomplish by doing his duty. Keeping h.s friend
company and from committing suicide were not things he hoped to
accomplish by doing his duty; accomplishing them was his duty. And
whether one describes what he intrinsically wants as doing his duty or
as keeping his friend from harming herself, William could intelligibly
and sincerely claim both that he doesn’t want to have to do this, this
evening, and that he doesn’t want to do this at all this evening.
The distinction between wanting all things considered and really
wanting also fails to capture the contrast being made in this case. To
say that going to see the films is what William really wanted to do is
not simply to say that that is what he would have done if his friend
hadn’t called, although it is what he would have done if she hadn t.
One can imagine a situation in which he was going to spend the entire
day drawing up a proposal, which he doesn t like to do very much. In
one sense, he really wants to get that proposal out of the way — in the
sense that he was strongly motivated to do so. In both cases, he would
rather spend the day doing what he had planned on doing before he
had received the call; in both cases, the original motivating influence
is overridden by the call of duty. And yet there is something different
about William’s wanting to see the Sherlock Holmes films when
compared with wanting to spend the day writing a proposal. When
William claims he really wants to go to see the films or that he wants
to see the films more than he wants to visit his friend, something else is
involved in wanting than simply being motivated more strongly one
way rather than the other. And when he denies that he wants to do his
duty, he is not denying that he is motivated to do so as an end; this
again suggests that something is missing, some features his being
motivated (wanting) to see the films has that his being motivated
(wanting) to visit his friend doesn’t have.
There are many indications of William’s wanting to see the films;
he was willing to do without other things he enjoys so that he would
be able to go see them; he had been looking forward to seeing them all
week; he had been excited when he first heard about them; he
mentioned several times the rare thrill it was to see Holmes come alive
before one’s eyes, something that only happened in Wontner’s films.
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After he had decided to spend the day with his friend, there were
indications that he didn’t really want to do so; he certainly wasn’t
looking forward to it and he thought it would be a joyless, difficult
time. Clearly, the central factor involved in this case is pleasure.
Pleasure seems to be connected with seeing the films in iwo ways:
first, William is pleased and excited about seeing them — he is
looking forward to it — and second, he seems to believe that seeing
them will be enjoyable. And in just these ways, pleasure is absent
from visiting his friend: he is not looking forward to it and he believes
that it will not be enjoyable. But pleasure is not a mere additional
factor to William’s being motivated to see the films; it is an integral
part of his wanting, it makes his wanting what it is — he would not
want if that factor were missing.
It would seem, then, that the connection a proposed action has
with pleasure can be a relevant factor in an agent’s being motivated to
perform that action. In the sense that William wanted to see those
films, in the sense that is connected to looking forward to something,
being excited about it, believing that it will be pleasurable, he
certainly did not want to go visit his friend, although in the motivated
sense, visiting his friend is what he wanted to do “most.”
VI.
On Not Wanting to to What One Intrinsically Wants to Do;
The Case of Value Motivation
Case Five: The Philandering Artist
Pierre wants very much to become a good artist and
believes he can make some contribution to the advancement
of art. Although he is conscientious in completing works
specifically commissioned, during the past two years he
has produced very little original work of his own. At
present there is a painting he wants to do and feels
strongly about completing it. But although he believes the
painting will be quite important, he spends his time
chasing women instead of creating. He doesn’t understand
his behavior and, in moments of reflection, he despises
himself for it. He wants very much to be an artist and to
excel at it; he thinks that his project is not only interesting
but also has the potential of being noticed. He wants to
complete the project and doesn’t want to chase women,
but this is what he does every chance he gets.
In the history of philosophy, there has been much discussion of
situations similar to Pierre’s, although these situations were differently
described. For some philosophers the issue was whether, and if so,
how akrasia was possible: roughly, akrasia occurs when a person
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does not do what he believes to be the right thing to do. The classical
formulation of the denial of the possibility of akrasia is that of
Socrates, reported and defended by Plato;^^ the classical formulation
of the anti-Socratic position can be found in the plays of Euripides.^2
Christian thinkers, however, were either concerned with a different
phenomenon or described it differently; the debate over weakness of
the will concerns the question: How is it possible to want to do that
which one knows is good and yet not do it? The classical formulation
of this problem is presented by St. Paul: “1 do not do the good 1 want
but the evil 1 do not want is what 1 do.”®^ Pierre’s situation seems to be
one of weakness of the will.
How does Pierre view the two activities in question? Creating art,
and doing it well, has been his ambition for years; for him, it is the
most worthwhile activity in which to be engaged. When asked what
he does or is interested in, he begins to talk about art; whenever he is
in a less than frivolous conversation, he introduces issues involving
art. Of the historical and contemporary figures he admires most, the
majority are either artists or persons known for their appreciation
and support of art. He is pleased with those artistic abilities he has so
far developed and is proud of those achievements he has made.
Chasing women, however, is not something he likes to talk about nor
is it something he admires in the behavior of others. He doesn’t
consider it a worthwhile or meaningful endeavor, no matter how
successful. He is ashamed when he hears his colleagues makingjokes
about him and “his women’’ and in moments of reflection, he despises
himself for his behavior. All of these various attitudes have something
in common: value judgments. What distinguishes his being motivated
to create from his being motivated to chase women is that the former
is connected to his values, while the latter is incompatible with them.
But Pierre’s values are not simply an additional factor to his being
motivated to create — as if he wants, in the widest sense, to create
and, in addition, values it as well — but rather they are an integral
part of his wanting; they make his wanting what it is — for if his
values were not involved in the way that they are, he would not have
the wants that he has.^^ Apparently, the connection that an activity or
action has with the agent’s values can be a factor in the agent being
motivated to engage in that activity.
VII.
Desiring and Valuing

The depressed friend and the philandering artist cases are illustra
tions of that perennial paradigm of motivational conflict, alternatively
characterized as “pleasure versus the good,’’ “inclination versus
duty,” “desire versus reason,” and “the flesh versus the spirit” — a
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motivational conflict that goes straight to the heart of the debate
between rationalism and voluntarism.
In the depressed friend case, William’s being motivated to see the
films is explained in terms of the characteristics he believes that
activity has by itself, rather than in terms of any relation it has to
some other act, activity or state of affairs. His account of why he
wants to see the films is likely to be couched in terms of how
enjoyable, exciting, thrilling they are, that is in terms of the
pleasurableness of experiencing them. Seeing the films is, for
William, an end-in-itself. In the philandering artist case, Pierre’s
chasing women isn’t seen by him to further his advance on some goal,
but as an exciting and enjoyable activity. On the conscious level,
Pierre is motivated to pursue sexual activity with a particular woman
as an end and it is an end because he enjoys such activity. It should be
clear from these two cases that there are patterns of purposive
behavior whose ends are actions, activities, or states-of-affairs that
are believed to be in some way associated with pleasure and are
pursued as an end because they are so associated.
William is motivated to visit his friend because he believes that it is
his duty to do so. Doing his duty, for William, is not seen as being a
means to something else nor is it in any way associated with pleasure
— in fact he believes the experience will be unpleasant and have
unpleasant consequences for him. Pierre is motivated to engage in
artistic creation because he believes it to be a noble and worthy
endeavor. Creating art is not seen by him as simply being a means of
livelihood or for something else. Pierre’s case illustrates that the
values involved in value-motivation need not be moral values; they
may be aesthetic values, political values, religious values, intellectual
values, etc. But what these cases do show is that there are purposive
patterns of behavior whose ends are in some way deemed valuable in
themselves and are pursued as ends because they are so esteemed.
From one’s own experience, it should be obvious that pleasuremotivation and value-motivation can come in conflict. Some things a
person enjoys doing or that give him pleasure are not things he values
— some many even be incompatible with his values, as in Pierre’s
case. Some things a person does because he values them are not
necessarily pleasant — some may even be unpleasant to do. And
while one value-motivation may at times conflict with another valuemotivation, these conflicts will either be resolved by, or cause a
change in, the internal structure of a person’s system of values. But
value-pleasure conflicts are different in kind, in that their resolution
does not depend upon what the agent’s value system is — for it is
precisely that value system that is being opposed from without. The
resolution depends not upon what the agent’s values are, but on how
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strong, motivationally, they are. It seems reasonable to conclude that
pleasure-motivation and value-motivation are different, distinct
kinds; pursuing and doing that which is (believed) good is not always
pleasurable, nor believed to be, while pursuing and doing that which
is pleasurable is not always valued.
The way in which “want” is used in the philandering artist’s case is
different from the way in which it is used in the depressed friend case.
But in both cases, the use of “want” is different from the narrower
sense of “wanting” indicating intrinsic wants; for although what the
agent is said to want to do, in both cases, is wanted as an end, so too is
what they are said not to want. In the philandering artist case, the end
Pierre is said to want, but which he does not do, is thought to be
valuable or worthy while the end he is said not to want, but which he
does pursue, is that which is not thought valuable. “Wanting,” then,
in this case is used to apply only to valued ends. In the depressed
friend case, on the other hand, the end William is said to want, but
which he does not do, is thought to be in some way pleasurable, while
the end he is said not to want, but which he does pursue, is something
not associated with pleasure. “Wanting,” in this case, is being used to
apply only to those ends associated with pleasure; consequently, it is a
different narrower use of “wanting” than that found in the philandering
artist case.
VIII.
Wanting One Thing More Than Another

In neither case (the depressed friend and the philandering artist)
does the distinction between intrinsic wanting and extrinsic wanting
help us to understand the contrasts being made. Nor is the
distinction, made in discussing the rape case, between coerced
wantingand uncoerced wanting, helpful. Perhaps, then, the distinction
between really wanting and wanting all things considered will be
sufficient to handle these two cases.
When a person is described as having really wanted to do other
than he did, the most plausible interpretation of the function of
“really” is that it is augmentative: what a person is said to “really
want” among alternatives is that which he wants more and most.
Using the widest sense of “wanting,” to want something more than
something else is to be more strongly motivated to do it. Consequently,
it does not make sense to say, using the widest sense of “wanting,”
that an agent wanted to do something more than what he did do.
What then is being claimed when a person is described as wanting to
do one thing more than another?
In the disappointed applicant case, however, really wanting or
wanting something more than what one did indicates not only a
64

motivational influence frustrated by one’s situation or overridden by
a stronger want, but also a want that is strongly felt. The strength of a
motivational influence can be exhibited in/wo ways: (1) the degree to
which it affects the agent’s behavior, and (2) the degree it affects the
agent’s consciousness — his feelings, thoughts, etc.-’*’ One indication
that a person is very strongly motivated to do something is that
doing it is what occupies his thoughts and is what he is said to feel
strongly about. This criterion for strength in a motivational influence
applies to all forms of motivation. This kind of motivational strength
is frequently manifested when the motivating force is frustrated. And
although the turbulence present in consciousness is likely to be
different for value-motivation than for desires, when frustrated there
can be turbulence nonetheless. The frustration of a desire (e.g., in the
depressed friend case) frequently takes the form of disappointment
—the stronger the desire, the more the person is disappointed. The
frustration of a value-motivation by some other (non-value) motiva
tional influence (e.g., in the philandering artist case), may reveal itself
to consciousness in the form of guilt or of dissatisfaction with one’s
self — the more value the person places on acting in such a way the
more he feels dissatisfaction. In some contexts, then, to talk about
wanting something more than another is to talk about that concerning
which one is more strongly affected.
When someone who must make a choice is advised to do what he
wants to do most, what is he (or she) being told to do? If the widest
sense of “wanting” is being used, they are being told to do that which
they are the most strongly motivated to do. But when John’s wife
presented him with the ultimatum to decide which he wanted more,
his family or his promotion, she is not asking him to conduct an
introspective inquiry into which he was more strongly motivated at
the present time to pursue; she apparently believes she already knows
the answer to that question, which is why she gave the ultimatum. In
many cases “which do you want more?” can be used, as it is here, to
say: consider your priorities; which is more important to you? On the
other hand, when Robert is asked which he wants to do most on his
birthday, see Star IVars, hear Das Rheingold at Wolf Trap, or
explore some old book stores, he is not being asked about priorities,
about his system of values; he is being asked which activity he would
enjoy more.
The meaning of the question “Which does an agent want to do
most?” depends upon which sense of “wanting” is being used; is the
agent being asked which option he would enjoy most, or which does
he consider more worthy, more important? In situations where both
pleasure and value are factors, it becomes even more crucial to be
clear about which question is being asked. Conflicts between
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pleasure-motivation and value-motivation cannot always bearbitrated
by the realization that doing what one values won’t be any fun or by
the judgment that enjoying oneself is not all that important. Since
values and desires are separate and often conflict, what one is said to
want most, or more than something else, will in many situations
depend upon from what perspective one is judging — from the point
of view of possible pleasure or from that of value.
While the notion of really wanting can be applied to both the
depressed friend and the philandering artist’s cases, it does not do
justice to the contrasts being made in those cases. Neither William
nor Pierre claim to want, all things considered, to do what they did —
they deny that they wanted to do it at all. Furthermore, William
seemed to feel strongly about going to visit his friend, even though he
didn’t want to. In addition, situations in which a person is asked
which of a number of things he wants more support the contention
that in some contexts to want something involves valuing it while in
other contexts it involves believing it to be pleasurable.
“Agent S wants to do A more than he wants to do B” can be used to
make several different claims: (1) the agent believes that doing A has
more value than doing B; (2) he believes doing A will be more
pleasurable than doing B; or (3) he is more strongly motivated to do
A than he is to do B. “Agent S really wanted to do other than he did”
is usually used to indicate that the agent’s consciousness was more
affected by what he is said to really want than was his behavior. This
can be accounted for by either the blocking of the behavorial
effectiveness of that want by some inhibiting factor or the want being
“overridden” by a motivational influence that was stronger, but not
felt to be stronger. The meaning of “really wanting” is context
dependent; it leads to the question “as opposed to what?” In some
contexts what it is opposed to is “being forced,” in others it is “out of
duty,” “guilt,” etc., and still others, it is “in order to . . . .”
IX.
Objections

The view 1 have been presenting has serious consequences for
voluntarism. At first, strict voluntarism had to be rejected in favor of
modest voluntarism. The realization that pain-avoidance and pleasurepursuit are different forms of motivation challenges modest volun
tarism. Modest voluntarism must be replaced by Hobbesian volun
tarism. Hobbesian voluntarism claims that there are two sources of
motivation: desire and aversion. This form of voluntarism is immune
to the problems of the previous two. More serious, however, is the
separation of value-motivation from pleasure-motivation. This separa
tion raises a possibility that threatens to destroy the foundation of all

forms of voluntarism: for when value-motivation stands alone, the
most plausible source of this kind of motivation is one’s valuejudgments or \a\ue-beliefs.
One is forgetting, the defender of voluntarism might argue, that the
recognition that something is one’s duty will be motivationally
effective only if one wants to do one’s duty; unless one wants to act in
accordance with some values, value-beliefs will be powerless. Thus,
whenever a person pursues the Good (in whatever sphere: morals,
religion, politics, etc.) he is motivated not by value-beliefs alone, but
by this desire for the Good. And when one rejects hedonism by
separating pleasure-motivation from value-motivation, one is recog
nizing that there are different kinds of desires. Voluntarism is not
required to claim that there is only one property desired for its own
sake, that there is only one kind of foundational desire. The two cases
under discussion reveal conflicts between two foundational desires:
the desire for pleasure and the desire to do one’s duty.
First, there is an important difference between the pursuit of a
pleasurable end and pursuing pleasure as an end, although that
difference is somewhat difficult to articulate. The hedonist, sensualist,
and thrill seeker do things in order to enjoy themselves. William,
Pierre, and many others, while doing things because they are
enjoyable, do not seethe pleasure as a result to be achieved. Although
pleasure can be taken as an end-in-itself, being pleasurable in these
cases, and in most cases, is a property of one class of ends, not an
end-in-itself. The object of desire, then, is usually not pleasure, but
rather that thing (object, action, activity) that is thought to be
pleasurable.
Second, as previously pointed out, William’s being motivated to
visit his friend is not separate from his valuings: he does not value
doing his duty and in addition want to do it. One possible way to view
William’s case^^ is to claim that values or valuings contain wants.
This move is a kind that I have called Davidsonian. According to this
view, a valuing is a compound “act”: a value judgment to the effect
that doing A has (value-)property 0 and a want to do things that have
property 0.
1 have argued that the widest sense of “wanting” is a “motivated”
sense, it indicates the fact that the agent is motivated to act but it does
not indicate what it is that is motivating him to act. The distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic wantings merely divides the territory
of the widest sense between these two types of wanting: but both are
still “motivated wants.” To say that S intrinsically wants to do A is to
say that S is motivated to pursue doing A as an end-in-itself; it does
not indicate what it is that is motivating S to so pursue doing A.
William does intrinsically want to do his duty. But this leaves open
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the question as to what is motivating him to do his duty. If there is a
sense of “wanting” that applies to motivating states, 1 am inclined to
say that it is not the case that William’s valuing contains a want but
that his valuing, his value-judgment is his want; it is what motivates
him.
To say that William would not have done his duty if he had not
wanted to do so is a truism because it is using a motivated sense of
“wanting”; he would not have done it if he had not been motivated to
do it. If motive determines whether one does one’s duty, we can even
say that he would not have done it if he had not been motivated to do
it as an end-in-itself. If all that is meant by a desire to do one’s duty is
that one is motivated to do one’s duty as an end-in-itself, this is not
incompatible with the falsity of voluntarism.
A person who pursues something as an end is not pursuing it
because of some external relationship it has to something else, but
because it is what it is, because it has certain properties. Pursuing
something as an end can be explained in terms of it having certain
properties, as when William is said to want to see the films because
they are enjoyable and to want to visit his friend because it was his
duty; but the property that determines something as an end is not
something else being pursued as an end, it is not the “real” end of that
pursuit. When we notice, however, that over a period of time there are
patterns in a person’s pursuits, that many of the ends he pursues have
some property in common, which is often cited as explaining the
pursuit, we attribute to the agent a disposition to pursue ends having
that property. We give explanations of particular pursuits in terms of
his wanting or desiring things with that property: a person who
regularly pursues things connected with glory is said to desire glory, a
person who collects things because they are beautiful is said to have a
desire for beauty, a person who pursues goals because they are moral
is said to desire to be moral, and so on. Explaining a person’s
purposive pursuit by citing such a want or desire places it within a
pattern of similar pursuits. Significantly many such patterns are
called character-traits, for in explaining a pursuit in terms of such a
pattern, we are explaining it by referring to the kind of person the
agent is.
To say that William visited his friend because it was his duty is to
explain his behavior in terms of a disposition to do or to pursue things
that are his duty. To talk of a desire or want to do his duty is to talk of
just such a disposition, just such a “trait” in his character — it is to use
“desire,” “want,” in the motivated sense. His desire, or want, is not
what is motivating him to pursue that kind of end, but is simply his
disposition, his tendency, to be motivated by considerations of duty.
Although recognizing that William’s moral act is explained in terms
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of a long-term dispositional want to do the moral thing, the defender
of voluntarism is misled by the motivated sense of “wanting”;
particular moral actions can be explained in terms of dispositional
wants, character-traits, but these wants are patterns of motivation,
not something that accounts for such patterns.
Voluntarism derives its plausibility from using the motivated sense
of “wanting” as if it referred to motivating states. Its mistake is to
infer from a person having a disposition to act morally the claim that
the want is what accounts for the disposition. If going to visit with his
friend was an end for William and the property relevant to its being
an end was that doing so was his duty, then William is the kind of
person who pursues ends because they are his duty — i.e., he has a
disposition to do those things he believes to be his duty. Thus it is true
that William wants to do his duty, that had he not had this want, the
consideration of duty would not have moved him, and yet it need not
be the case that separate from and accounting for his dispositional
state is a “want” or a “desire” to be moral that motivates him to act
morally.®®
It might be argued that one need not postulate two narrower senses
of “wanting,” one applying to pleasure-motivation, the other to
value-motivation, in order to deal adequately with the cases of the
depressed friend and the philandering artist. What these two cases
illustrate, it could be said, is not two different sense of “want,” but
two different reasons for wanting. Limiting the discussion to pursuitmotivation, there are three kinds of reasons for wanting to do
something: (1) it is a means to something else one wants; (2) it is
pleasurable; and (3) it is good (has value). Explaining an action or a
want in terms of the first kind of reason shows that the behavior was
performed as a means and the want was generated by another want;
explaining an action or a want in terms of the second or third kind of
reason shows that the behavior was performed as, and the want
directed to, an end. Reasons as inducements operate in a similar way.
Given that a person wants to do A, then if he was to be convinced that
doing B is a means to doing A, he may (by transitivity of motivational
influence) come to want to do B. Similarly, given a person who is
usually motivated to do pleasurable things or to do things worthwhile,
to convince them that doing A will be pleasurable or will be
worthwhile is likely to result in that person becoming motivated to do
A.
But relying on the notion of a reason for wanting, rather than
distinguishing between two narrower senses of “wanting,” will not be
enough to render intelligible the conflicts involved in the two cases. In
the first place, William and Pierre are both motivated toward two
different ends, one of which is wanted because it is associated with
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pleasure, the other because it is valued; even usingjust the notion of a
reason for wanting, there is a distinction between value-motivation
and pleasure-motivation. But the crux is that these two motivational
influences are in conflict in each case. Even if one were to know what
can count as a reason for wanting, how those reasons can conflict,
and what it is for one reason to be stronger than another, the
descriptions of the agents as not wanting to do what they did and of
wanting to do what they didn’t will remain unintelligible if only the
widest sense of “wanting” is used. Clearly, these cases do indicate
different reasons for being motivated, but it is equally clear that these
cases cannot be adequately understood unless “want,” in each case, is
used to mean something more than “is motivated to” — for in each
case, “want” is used in such a way that the reason for being motivated
is involved in its meaning.
X.
Conclusion

What 1 have tried to show in this paper is that there is a plausible
alternative to voluntarism. My method for doing this is to look at
ways we talk about and explain actions. (1) 1 have argued that the
way in which the widest sense of “wanting” operates in explanations
does not lend support to voluntarism. (2) I have also argued that
descriptions of agents as not wanting to do what they intentionally
did do and of wanting to do something they didn’t do more than they
wanted to do what they did do provide us with insights that at first
require modifications to voluntarism. But there are cases, however, in
which the agent can claim that he didn’t want to do what he
intentionally did do that raise a serious challenge to voluntarism. In
cases like that of the depressed friend, the claim is that one doesn’t
think that doing what one will do will be enjoyable in any way. One
wants to do that which is associated with pleasure and doesn’t want to
do that which is not. Consequently, pleasure is a factor relevant to a
person being motivated to do something. In cases like the philandering
artist, the claim is that one sees no value in doing what one is doing.
One wants to do that which one values and doesn’t want to do that
which one does not.
There is historical precedent for calling the concept corresponding
to the sense of “wanting” applicable to pleasure-motivation the
concept of desire: for traditionally (I) pleasure has been associated
with desires whenever values were associated with reason, and
(2) desires have been most often cited as that which is responsible for
pleasure-value conflicts. The concept of desire, then, will be that
concept of wanting governing pleasure-motivation.
There is nothing illegitimate in using “desire” in such a way that all
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and only things pursued as ends are objects of desire. But this use of
“desire” is unhelpful in many situations requiring want-explanations.
Furthermore, it renders unintelligible the descriptions given in many
instances of motivational conflict. Nor is there anything illegitimate
in using “desire” to refer only to pleasure-motivation. The plausibility
of there being such a thing as pleasure-motivation distinct from
value-motivation and pain-avoidance motivation I have tried to
establish. In addition, this use of “desire” not only has historical
precedent, it enables us to talk intelligibly about those instances of
motivational conflict between pleasure and value.
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